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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON REGIONAL AMENITIES AND PUBLIC POLICIES
By
ELENA YEVGENYEVNA ANDREYEVA
AUGUST, 2016
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation investigates how alterations in government policies affect the level of, and
access to, public amenities, and how outcomes vary across space. The first essay sheds light on
whether the recentralization of political institutions in Russia affected the provision of regional
public services. First, I exploit regional variation in governors’ party affiliation to assess the
impact of a uniform change in political institutions towards more centralization on the level of
public services provision across states. Second, I investigate whether the combined effect,
recentralization and party affiliation, is different among local and global public services. I find
that a change in the region’s affiliation newly aligning with the central government party induced
by the policy change increases the level of global public services by 1-2 percent. However, I find
no such effect on the provision of local public services.
The second essay is joint work with Carlianne Patrick. We exploit a unique characteristic of
10 charter schools in the metropolitan Atlanta area to identify property value capitalization of
charter schools. Each of the 10 charter schools has two priority zones: households located in
priority zone one have a higher probability of admission than households located in priority zone
two. This study exploits spatial variation in the likelihood of attending a charter school between
priority zone one and two to identify their effect on single-family home values using annual data
on housing transactions. Our results indicate that prices increased by 6-8% for priority one zone
homes compared to priority two zone homes after the opening of a new charter school. We also

find that the priority one zone capitalization increases as the home’s traditional public school
performs worse.
The third essay is joint work with Benjamin Ukert. We estimate the causal effect of the
Australian National Firearms Agreement on firearm mortality. Our identification strategy relies
on state variation in the pre-NFA firearm death rates in 1994-1996. The results suggest that the
NFA decreased the total firearm death rate by 60%. The reduction in the total firearm death rate
is driven by large decreases in the firearm homicide and firearm suicide rates, while we find no
changes in the accidental and undetermined intent firearm death rate.
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Introduction
Communities are heavily influenced by a variety of public policies and institutions. In this
dissertation I explore how alterations in government policies affect the level of, or access to,
public amenities, and how outcomes vary across space.
In the first essay I evaluate whether the recentralization of regional political institutions in
Russia had significant effects on the provision of regional public services. Specifically, I look at
the new legislation that replaced popular elections of regional governors with direct presidential
appointments in December of 2004. I contribute to existing literature in a number of ways: first, I
exploit novel data on regional variation in governors’ party affiliation (i.e. in opposition to or
aligned with the central administration) to assess the impact of a uniform change in regional
political institutions towards more centralization on the level of public services provision across
states. In addition, I investigate whether the combined effect, recentralization and party
affiliation, varies across types of public services with respect to their interregional spillover
effects. I find that a change in the region’s affiliation newly aligning with the central government
party induced by the policy change increased the level of high-spillover public services, such as
education and healthcare outcomes, by 1 and 2-6%, respectively. I also find that the provision of
public services without interregional spillovers, such as public utilities and public transportation,
was not significantly affected by the region’s realignment with the central government party.
The second essay is joint work with Carlianne Patrick. This work complements literature on
school choice and its effects on housing prices. We exploit a unique feature of ten charter
schools in the metropolitan Atlanta area to identify their property value capitalization. The
charter schools in our study designate small geographic areas within their attendance areas as
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priority zones. Each charter school in our sample has two priority zones: families residing in
priority zone one have a higher probability of admission than families residing in priority zone
two. We use spatial variation in the charter school enrollment probabilities between priority zone
one and two to identify the effect on single-family home values using annual data on residential
transactions. We find that parents are willing to pay about 6-8% - or $8,845-$13,470 – more for
houses located in priority zone one within 0.3 miles from the border with priority zone two,
following the charter school opening. The capitalization effects for houses located in priority
zone one within 0.1 miles and 0.5 miles from the border with priority zone two are similar. In
addition, we find that the priority one zone capitalization increases as the home’s traditional
public school performs worse.
The third essay is joint work with Benjamin Ukert. We evaluate the Australian National
Firearms Agreement (NFA), which introduced comprehensive national gun regulations and a gun
buyback program in May of 1996 after a mass shooting that killed 35 people in Tasmania,
Australia. This paper estimates the causal effect of the NFA on firearm and non-firearm
mortality. We estimate a difference-in-differences model relying on cross-sectional variation in
the pre-NFA firearm mortality rates in 1994-1996. Our approach relies on the assumption that
the law was more effective in states with higher pre-1997 firearm mortality rates. Our results
suggest that the NFA implementation decreased the total firearm mortality rate by 60%. The
reduction in the total firearm mortality rate is predominantly driven by reductions in the firearm
homicide rates, 96%, and firearm suicide rates, 50%, while we find no changes in the accidental
and undetermined intent firearm mortality rate. We also find evidence that the non-firearm
mortality rate decreased, which is driven by a reduction in the non-firearm accidents and
undetermined intent rate. Finally, using regression discontinuity design, and applying monthly
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robbery data for the state of New South Wales, we find that non-firearm and non-weapon
robberies have increased by 35 and 20%, respectively, following the passage of the NFA, which
may suggest substitution away from firearms.

3

Chapter I: Governors’ Party Affiliation and Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences
Analysis of Recentralization in Russia
1. Introduction
Over the past several decades the impact of political institutions on the provision of public
services has been one of the most contested topics in political economy. Decentralization
improves quality of local service provision due to the information advantage of local
governments (through reduction in matching and signaling costs), their accountability to
constituents (Oates 1972), and their control over public spending (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
However, political decentralization is not without downsides. It may increase administrative and
coordination costs (Breton and Scott 1978). Local governments are also more susceptible to
“capture by local elite” than are central governments (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, Bardhan
2002, Blanchard and Schleifer 2001). Finally, they can also suffer from lack of talented and
qualified people in key administrative positions increasing poor-quality decision making
(Bardhan 2002, Fisman and Gatti 2002, Brueckner 2000).
The aforementioned downsides of decentralization have led to recentralization of political
power in some developing nations (Dickovick 2011). Empirical evidence on the effects of
recentralization on subnational provision of public services, however, is limited since
recentralization is a relatively recent phenomena, and its analysis is difficult.1 As a result, further
research on recentralization is necessary especially if more nations choose to recentralize in the
future.
In this paper I contribute to the empirical literature on recentralization by analyzing what
happens to the level of provision of public services when a nation’s regional political institutions

1

Most empirical testing has been done using either cross-country studies, or country-level panel studies, both of
which lack presence of a uniform change in political institutions across all observations. In addition, many studies
lack data on regional-level recentralization.
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are transformed from being democratically decentralized to democratically centralized, using the
change in political institutions that took place in the Russian Federation in 2004. Democratic
decentralization is expressed in the popular election of regional governors, while democratic
centralization is expressed in the presidential appointment of governors. Notably, I evaluate
whether the effect of recentralization on the provision of public services is a function of the
region’s party affiliation (central or opposition) and the type of public services in question, with
an emphasis on the degree of interregional spillover of services. The analysis is twofold. First, I
evaluate whether the regions with a longer history of affiliation with a strong central party fair
differently after recentralization than regions whose affiliation with the central party was induced
just recently by the shift towards more centralized political institutions. Second, I investigate
whether the combined effect, recentralization and party affiliation, is different across types of
public services with respect to their interregional spillover effects.
Why would party affiliation have a differential effect on public services with higher vs. lower
spillover effects? The central government as opposed to a local government tends to provide
public services if those public services generate large spillover effects across jurisdictions
(Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). The reason is that local governments aim to satisfy only local
demand for public spending since their future reelection depends primarily on local constituents’
satisfaction with executive performance. As a result, public services, whose benefits cross
municipal and state lines, are often underprovided. However, Riker (1964) argues that the
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presence of strong central parties in regional government can effectively internalize spillovers by
aligning regional public spending with national interests.23
Using data on history of governors’ party affiliation between 2000 and 2012, my empirical
strategy compares regions affiliated with central and opposition parties. I present estimates
identified by the difference in pre- and post- recentralization levels of public services provision. I
find that a change in the region’s affiliation from opposition to central party induced by the shift
towards more centralized political institutions increases provision of public services with larger
spillover effects, such as education and healthcare. Specifically, school enrollment increased by
roughly 1 percent, population-to-doctor ratio decreased by close to 2 percent, and infant
mortality decreased by almost 6 percent.4 Second, the provision of public services with low
spillover effects, such as public utilities and transportation, did not appear to significantly depend
on pre- and post-centralization party affiliation.5 The results are consistent with hypothesis that
centralized party affiliation should primarily affect public services with substantial interregional
spillovers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature
on both decentralized and centralized political institutions. Section 3 describes in more detail the
2004 change in governors’ appointment procedure, the Russian’s central party, and the opposing
parties. Section 4 presents the theory on the influence of the new governors’ appointment statute

2

Riker (1964) describes presence of strong central parties as an alternative to centralization when it comes to
internalizing interregional spillovers.
3
A number of previous studies augment decentralization with presence of strong central parties (Enikolopov and
Zhyravskaya 2007, Ponce-Rodriguez et al. 2012, Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas 2006). They find their positive joint
impact on public goods’ provision, particularly in existence of spillover effects.
4
Educational and health outcomes, in addition to the level of sulfur dioxide emissions, are my proxies for public
services with higher interregional spillover effects.
5
Public utilities and public transportation are my proxies for public services with lower interregional spillover
effects.
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on the level public service provision. Section 5 lays out the empirical approach. Section 6
describes data. Section 7 presents the main results. Section 8 concludes.
2. Literature Review
A series of previous studies have analyzed the consequences of a switch in political
institutions on the provision of local public services. A group of these papers discuss practical
issues regarding the decentralization of political powers, i.e. redistribution of political functions
away from the central authority (Bardhan 2002, Fisman and Gatti 2002, Blanchard and Schleifer
2001, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, Breton and Scott, 1978). Even though conventional theory
predicts more efficient provision of public services in economies with greater political
decentralization, a positive relationship between political decentralization and provision of local
public services may be undermined by such factors as inferior-quality decision-making at the
local level, weak local accountability even in the presence of direct elections, and capture by
local elites. Poor-quality decision making may result from inefficient methods of bureaucratic
monitoring or lack of talented and qualified people to fill the administrative positions (Bardhan
2002, Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Political decentralization might also increase administrative and
coordination costs (Breton and Scott 1978). Previous studies argue that administrative
subordination, i.e. the appointment of the regional branches of the executive government by the
central government, may improve the outcomes of decentralization (Blanchard and Schleifer
2001).
Another body of literature illustrates the advantages of political decentralization for public
services provision (Enikolopov and Zhyravskaya 2007, Bardhan 2002, Gallego 2010, Fisman
and Gatti 2002). Bardhan (2002) concludes that the correlation between decentralization and
local services provision is on average positive after reviewing case studies on Bolivia, Brazil,
Bangladesh, Mexico, India and a number of other developing countries. Gallego (2010) finds
7

that cross-country differences in education are positively affected by such political institutions as
local democracy, which in turn are correlated with historic colonial factors.
An important factor that drives a positive relationship between political decentralization and
public services provision in the literature is the presence of local accountability which
incentivizes politicians who gain their offices through popular elections to acquire complete
information on local preferences (Fisman and Gatti 2002, Enikolopov and Zhyravskaya 2007,
Riker 1964).
The previous literature highlights the debate on whether some political institutions are better
equipped to provide public services with significant interregional spillover effects. Some studies
theorize that if spillovers reach a critical level then centralization is preferable since
decentralization will lead to under-provision of those services (Besley and Coate 2003, Seabright
1996)6. However, empirical studies demonstrate that decentralization can succeed in efficiently
allocating resources even in cases of public services with higher inter-jurisdictional spillovers
(Ogawa and Wildasin 2007).
A final relevant series of studies investigates the consequences for public spending when
political decentralization is enhanced by the presence of strong central parties. Previous research
suggests that presence of strong political parties may help to internalize spillover effects of local
public services provision even if regional political leaders are subject to popular elections
(Enikolopov and Zhyravskaya 2007, Ponce-Rodriguez et al. 2012, Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas
2006). Political decentralization generates local accountability, while strong central parties
incentivize elected officials to provide public services with spillover effects. Strong national
parties may solve the issue of “local capture” through generating career concerns for locally

6

Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini (2003) add that centralization can solve the underprovision issue only under
certain conditions, like absence of cooperative lobbying interests in the regions.
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elected political leaders, and incentivizing them to resist local elite influence (Enikolopov and
Zhyravskaya 2007). Ponce-Rodriguez et al. (2012) find that interaction of political
decentralization and party centralization produces the most efficient level of public service
provision. Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas (2006) argue that the degree of nationalization of party
system is important in determining how maneuverable governments can be in their decisions
over implementation of fiscal policy by changing the transactions cost of collective decision
making.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I assess the impact of a
uniform change in political institutions towards more centralization, in the form of regional
governors’ office appointments, on the level of public services provision across regions. The
application of the same law to all regions of Russia allows me to avoid issues related to countrylevel analysis arising from within country heterogeneity in quality of government, or degree of
decentralization (Cerulli and Filippetti 2014). Second, I test what role strong national parties play
in changing the provision of public spending by exploiting regional variation in governors’
timing and strength of affiliation with the central party. Third, I investigate whether the
combined effect, recentralization and party affiliation, is different across types of public services
with respect to their interregional spillover effects.
3. Historical Background
Two events contributed to the recentralization of Russia’s regional political institutions: the
new governors’ appointment law of 2004, and the increased influence of the pro-central
government United Russia (UR) party. Both events may have affected the level of public service
provisions in Russia after 2004. In the first case, governors were no longer subject to popular
elections and their local accountability was significantly weakened. Weak accountability might
have resulted in less responsiveness to their constituents’ demands leading to deterioration in
9

funding of public services, which may not have been a priority for the central authorities. In the
second case, a higher incidence of affiliation with the UR party among governors might have
increased spending on mutually beneficial public goods by lowering the bargaining cost.
3.1 New governors’ appointment law
To test whether decentralization of political power leads to a different level of local public
services provision than the centralization of political power (i.e., having central government
directly appoint regional leaders), I use a law change that took place in 2004 with regards to how
regions (states) in Russia determined their governors. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 and up until 2005, the governors of the 89 regions of the Russian Federation were mostly
elected by popular vote of their respective constituencies.78 However, on September 13, 2004
President Vladimir Putin addressed his government with a proposal to eliminate the popular
election of governors and replace it with a system of presidential appointment.
According to the proposed legislation, the governors would no longer be directly elected by
popular vote, but would be nominated by the President, and confirmed by the regional
assemblies. Putin’s argument against the existing system of popular elections was the supposed
inability of regional executive branches to successfully deal with potential crises (as
demonstrated by the Beslan hostage crisis). The new bill would also give Putin the right to fire
governors on the grounds of “loss of President’s confidence”. Additionally, regional assemblies
would face dissolution if they rejected the proposed candidate three times. Governors who were
elected by popular vote before the passage of the new legislation were allowed to finish serving

7

Between 1991 and 1993 gubernatorial elections were mostly unsuccessful for Kremlin appointees. As a result,
President Yeltsin appointed 45 out of 49 regional governors between 1991 and 1995. The first widespread round of
governors’ elections took place in 1996-1997, which led to a failure rate of more than 50% for Kremlin’s
incumbents (Goode 2007).
8
Russia has 89 states according to the 1993 constitution. Overtime some of them have been merged, leaving only 83
as of January 1, 2008.
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their current term. They could however appeal to the President for reappointment before their
term was out (Goode 2007). 9 The bill was signed into law on December 11, 2004. The first
round of appointments and reappointments began as soon as February 2005.
3.2 United Russia from 1999 to 2003

The UR party was originally named Unity, and created as a pro-presidential party just prior
to the 1999 State Duma10 elections. Its main campaign characteristics were national integrity and
association and support for Putin who at the time was serving as acting President of Russia. After
the 1999 elections, which were relatively successful for Unity, it merged with another party, the
Fatherland-All Russia to form the UR party. In the 2003 Duma elections, UR won 68 percent of
the parliament seats. It also managed to establish large majorities in the 2003 regional elections.
According to Konitzer and Wegren (2006), the regional branches of UR were more loyal to the
President and to the central party organization than to the elected governors, which helped
strengthened the “democratic centralization.” As a result, many regional governors had to either
associate themselves with the presidential party, or face strong central opposition.11 In summary,
party’s regional dominance was sufficient to align regional and national interests internalizing
the spillover effects.
4. Theoretical Framework and Main Hypothesis
Consider an economy that consists of distinct geographically divided regions. The
government of each region provides two types of public services, with higher and lower
interregional spillover effects. The provision of public services with high spillover effects
benefits the local population of the region, and populations of the surrounding regions. The
During the first round of appointments in 2005-2006, 24 out 47 sitting governors appealed for the President’s
decision for nomination before their term has expired. Putin agreed to appoint all of them as governors for their
respective regions. The majority of the governors who did not appeal directly to the President, and followed the
nomination procedure, lost their offices (Goode 2007).
10
The State Duma is a lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia (Russian parliament).
11
During the 2003 governor elections, candidates backed by the United Russia won in 81 percent of the cases
(Konitzer and Wefren 2006).
9
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provision of public services with low spillover effects benefits only the local population of the
region. The question is whether different political institutions vary in the level of spending on
public services with high vs. low spillovers.
An economy may choose to provide public services in a decentralized fashion, where
regional governments make the expenditure decision, or in a centralized fashion, where the
central government makes expenditure decisions providing uniform level of public services
across all regions.12 Besley and Coate (2003) suggest that one may compare performance of
decentralized and centralized political institutions by looking at aggregate surplus of public
services. The authors argue that in a decentralized system public services are under-provided in
the presence of spillovers, accordingly, the surplus level is decreasing in the degree of spillovers.
On the contrary, in a centralized system the level of public services is exogenous with respect to
the amount of spillovers. Besley and Coate (2003) show that centralized institutions produce
higher level of public services’ surplus than decentralized institutions under two conditions.
First, if districts are homogeneous and spillovers are present, and second, if districts are
heterogeneous, and spillovers are sufficiently high. However, a centralized regime may
overprovide public goods if spillover effects across districts are higher than a certain “critical”
level.
Given the theoretical predictions described above, why would the passage of new legislation
regarding governors’ appointment lead to a different level of spending on public services across
Russian states? Regions in Russia are considerably heterogeneous in their socio-economic

12

Some studies state that the uniformity condition initially assumed by Oates does not have to be the case in a
centralized system. Besley and Coate (2003) mention that theoretical and empirical evidence does not reject the
hypothesis that central government might be able to provide heterogeneous amounts of public goods across regions
according to local preferences. Bardhan (2002) argues that centralized government may be able to get the same
precise information through local agents. However, in this study, I continue to assume uniformity for practical
considerations.
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characteristics, therefore the central government would be less likely to satisfy local preferences
providing uniform level of public services across all regions. In addition, the absence of direct
elections would weaken governors’ incentives to satisfy local demand for public services
reducing incentives to provide the central government with complete information on local
preferences. Even in a scenario where governors provide the central government with as
complete information as possible, the central government may find differentiation among regions
costly due to political reasons. Similarly, even when spillover effects are large, decentralization
might not necessarily lead to under-provision of public services. Studies by Ponce-Rodriguez et
al. (2012) as well as Riker (1964) showed that strong central parties align political choices of
local officials with national preferences, thus effectively internalizing spillover effects across
jurisdictions. Since a central party seeks to maximize the number of regions it can win the
elections in, its objective is to satisfy local preferences for public services across the country,
which can be achieved through internalizing the spillover effects in each region. Members of the
central party can achieve their objective by impacting regional governors’ political careers, thus
encouraging them to choose a level of public services provision that generates more surplus.
Based on the framework described above I propose to test the following hypothesis:
1.

Governors’ centralized appointment after the new law should be associated with an
increase in provision of public services with large interregional spillover effects, for all
regions in which the previously elected governor did not belong to the central party of
power.

2.

Governors’ centralized appointment after the new law should be associated with no
significant differences in provision of public services with large spillover effects, for
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all regions in which the previously elected governor was already a member of the
central party of power.
3.

Governors’ centralized appointment after the new law should be associated with
insignificant changes in provision of public services without spillover effects
regardless of party affiliation.

Of course the level of public services provision by subnational governments depends not
only on political institutions, but more directly on regional differences in tax rates and revenues.
According to Tiebout (1956), constituents sort into jurisdictions with higher or lower tax rates
based on their demand for public services. As a results, regions with higher levels of public
services are often regions with higher tax rates and revenues. Accordingly, one might argue that
my analysis is incomplete without controlling for the differences in tax statutes across Russian
regions. However, changes in the Russian tax code demonstrate why differences in subnational
taxes are not an issue in the case of the Russian Federation’s regional governments. The most
significant change is centralization of tax revenue between 2000 and 2005.
During the 1990’s, the Russian intergovernmental system of tax collection and sharing was
rapidly changing, with wealthier regions, looking for more budgetary autonomy from the center,
and poorer regions continuously relying on Moscow for federal grants. During the years of the
Yeltsin presidency, stronger regional governors successfully lobbied for larger revenue
autonomy as well as a larger share of central government taxes, such as the value added tax.
Putin’s administration spent his first presidential term trying to recentralize many taxes in order
to increase central authority in the country. The administration introduced the new Tax Code in
2000. Its chapters were gradually enacted in 2000-2005. The new legislature prohibited
introduction of any new regional or municipal taxes not outlined in the new Tax Code.
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According to the new Tax Code, value added tax became recentralized once again, and regional
sales taxes, which provided a significant amount of own revenues for regional governments,
were eliminated. As a result, federal government’s proportion of total tax revenues reached 63
percent by 2004 decreasing the share of subnational governments from 43.5 to 36.17 percent
between 2000 and 2004. As a result, the new Tax Code reduced the budgetary autonomy of
regional and local governments relative to 1990’s (Tax Reform in Russia 2008).
5. Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy
There are two sources of variation that I use to test my hypotheses. First, some governors
chose to be affiliated with either the central party (UR), which has had the majority of Parliament
seats since 2003, or one of the opposition parties, with a consistent minority in Parliament seats
(KPRF, LDPR, SR), or an inconsistent minority with the possibility of complete absence of any
Parliament seats (SPS, APR, DPR, Rodina, RPSD, TU, NPSR, RNR, UDM)13. For my analysis,
I use the governor’s party affiliation as a proxy for the strength of the central party in each
region. All regions in Russia are divided into three distinct groups: group 1 consists of regions
with governors who affiliated themselves with the opposition party before the 2004 law change,
and the UR party shortly after the change14; group 2 consists of regions that had governors from
the UR party before and after the change in appointment law; group 3 consists of regions with
governors from an opposing party before and after the change, with a later transition to UR party
affiliation (see Figure 7 in Appendix 1).
Second, I use variation in the intensity of public services interregional spillovers. Based on
the framework discussed in Section 4, the provision of public services with higher spillovers may
benefit more from centralization than the provision of public services with weak spillovers if

13
14

See Appendix 1 for more details on opposition parties.
There is a regional variation in the year of change.
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those goods were underprovided prior to the new bill15. However, there should be no effect on
public services without spillovers.
My objective is to identify the average effect of political centralization on the provision of
public services in regions whose affiliation with the central party was incentivized by the new
appointment law. As a result, I compare the level of public services provision after centralization
when the state is affiliated with the central party to the counterfactual, the level of public services
provision for the same state affiliated with the opposition party at the same point in time.
However, since the counterfactual is not observable, I need to find a good representation. Ideally,
I would need to randomly assign party affiliation across states, and compare their average
outcomes. Since a controlled randomized experiment is not possible, I turn to an alternative nonexperimental method that most closely mimics a randomized trial under a set of assumptions.
In order to identify the causal relationship of interest, I use a difference-in-differences
methodology16 by exploiting variation in timing of affiliation with the central party across states.
A key identification assumption in this strategy is that in the absence of regional variation in
affiliation with the central party, public services provision would have trended similarly among
all states--- conditional on regional fixed effects-- after the passage of the appointment law. One
potential threat is that governors’ decisions to change their party affiliation from opposition to
the central government was correlated with the way public services were provided in their
regions. In reality, it is more likely that governors’ choice to change party affiliation was driven
by the desire to remain or become the head of the region. Affiliation with UR served as a means
to signal political loyalty to the central government, and specifically to President Putin.

15

Though Sigman (2013) found a positive relationship between decentralization and interregional variation in
provision of public services with spillover effects like environmental protection if the central government does not
allow for sufficient variation across regions with heterogeneous preferences.
16
Difference-in-differences models allow to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across regions.
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Figure 1 illustrates the trends in public services’ provision for regions in groups 1 and 2. The
line with solid diamonds represents the average level of public services’ provision in any given
year among the treatment states, i.e., states where governors have change their party affiliation to
UR after 2004. The vertical line reflects the year in which the new appointment law was passed.
The line with solid circles shows the average level of public services’ provision in any given year
among states that belong to the control group, i.e., states where governors affiliated themselves
with UR before 2004.
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Figure 1: Trends in public services provision before and after the new appointment law

Notes: Dependent variables are on the y-axis: enrollment rate is measured as a percentage of
school-age children enrolled in elementary and secondary public schools; infant mortality is
measured as deaths of children under 1 year of age per 1000 live births; SO2 emissions are
measured in 1,000 tons; sewage is measured as a number of central sewage systems, excluding
rain drainages, located in population districts per capita; bus volume is measured in passengerkilometers, distance traveled by passengers on buses, per capita. The line with solid diamonds
represents the average annual level of public services’ provision in treatment states. The vertical
line shows the year (2005) in which the governors’ appointment law was enacted. The line with
solid circles shows the average level of public services’ provision in control states.

As shown in Figure 1, treatment and control states follow somewhat similar provision trends
prior to the appointment law suggesting that there were little systematic differences between the
two types of states other than differences in levels, while controlling for by state fixed effects
and time dummies.
18

The difference-in-differences approach can be specified in the following fixed effect linear
regression model:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 ∆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(1)

where the dependent variable 𝑦 is a measure of a public service in region i and year t; X is an
array of regional controls; 𝜃𝑖 is a fixed effect unique to state i, and 𝜇𝑡 is a time fixed effect
common to all states in period t. The error 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a state time-varying error, which is assumed to
be independently distributed for all 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 . Since the errors might be correlated across time
and space, I compute my standard errors clustered at the state level to allow for an arbitrary
covariance structure within states over time.
In this model, 𝛼 is the difference-in-differences estimate of the average effect of a change in
governor’s party affiliation in region i induced by the recentralization on the level of public
services provision.
In the above model, the dependent variable y is a measure of a specific public service like
healthcare, education, pollution, public utilities and transportation. I expect 𝛼 parameters to be
different for public services with higher spillover effects (pollution, education and healthcare)
than those with lower spillover effects (public utilities and public transportation) since presence
of strong central party influences regional provision of former, but not later types of services.
The vector of controls, X, includes the percentage of population living below the poverty
threshold, real GDP per capita or income per capita, population density, urban population,
percentage of school-age children, and ethnic fractionalization, which is measured as a percent of
population who report belonging to a non-Russian ethnicity, and a dummy for whether the region
is affiliated with the UR. The control variables try to account for the degree of decentralization
as well as the rationales for potential reappointment, which may depend on the ethnic origins of a
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particular area (Enikolopov and Zhyravskaya 2007, Robalino et al. 2001). Additionally, real
GDP per capita, population density, and urbanization typically have large effects on the degree
of decentralization (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005).
6. Data
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the depended and independent variables included in
the analysis.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable
Dependent variables
General public school enrollment
Pupil to teacher ratio
SO2 emissions
NO2 emissions
Infant mortality
Population to doctor ratio
# of heat sources per capita
# of sewage systems per capita
Bus volume
Paved road volume

Units

N

Mean

S.D.

%
#
1,000 ton
1,000 ton
per 1,000
#
#
#
Passenger-km
km/area (1000 sq. km)

848
1101
995
1000
1048
1111
1108
1018
1061
1035

86.83
11.01
20.48
15.31
11.74
225.41
825.92
130.61
189,258.6
13,239.59

5.23
1.99
34.38
19.53
5.00
52.05
633.55
139.34
184,723
14,369.37

Water cleaning per capita
Socio-economic characteristics
Real GDP per capita
Real income per capita
Urbanization rate

1,000 cubic meters

1005

0.07

0.03

RUB
RUB
%

1027
929
1119

137,713.10
10,912.82
68.14

161,553.80
8,133.40
14.56

Population density
Ethnic fractionalization
Poverty rate

population/area (sq. km)
%
%

1118
1131
1064

178.63
0.24
22.99

1113.13
0.23
12.53

School-age children (7-16) to
population ratio
Unemployment rate

%
%

956
820

0.13
8.45

0.03
6.00
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The dataset on outcomes of public goods provision, governors’ party affiliation, and control
variables covers 91 federal regions of Russia17 for the years 2000-2012.18 Data are available
from the Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) as well as 2002 and 2010
Russian Census. My dependent variables of interest are an array of public services with and
without interregional spillover effects. Public services with spillovers are environmental quality,
education outcomes, and healthcare outcomes.19 Environmental quality is measured in terms of
sulfur dioxide emissions, which are linked with adverse effects on the respiratory system20.
According to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, the biggest sources of its
emissions in Russia are fuel (coal) combustion at metallurgical and power plants. Education
outcomes are measured as a percentage of school-age children enrolled in elementary and
secondary public schools, and pupil-to-teacher ratio. Infant mortality is calculated as the number
of deaths of children under the age of 1 per 1000 live births; population-to-doctor ratio also
serves as a proxy for the effectiveness of the health care system21 (Robalino et al. 2001). Public
services without interregional spillover effects are public utilities, such as heating and sewage
sources, and water treatment22, and public transportation23. Public utilities are measured as a
number of central sewage systems, excluding rain drainages, located in population districts per

17

Chechen Republic is excluded from the analysis due to the Second Chechen War, which started in 1999,
continued until 2003.
18
Data for some dependent variables and covariates is missing for some of the earlier years.
19
A large percentage of infant deaths in Russia are due to infections and parasitic diseases as well as poor
environmental quality. As a result, infant mortality represents a category of healthcare provision that might exhibit
interregional spillover effects (1996 WHO report).
20
Pollution data at the regional level are scarce and published infrequently.
21
Changes in immunization would indicate a more immediate effect on the efficiency of the health care system than
infant mortality. However no pre-2005 immunization information exists at the required geographic level. In
addition, infant mortality can only serve as a proxy for public services as it is really an output of a function of the
quality of public services provision, and not an input into it.
22
Perhaps, a better measure of public utilities provision is percentage of households with access to residential water
or sewage systems as opposed to counts of water and sewage systems. However, data on household access to public
utilities is not available prior to 2007.
23
Measures like public street lightning or street paving represent better examples of public services with low
spillovers. However, statistics on these services are not available at the required geographic level, and time frame.
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capita; thousands of cubic meters of water run though sewage treatment per capita; and number
of central heating systems per capita. Public transportation is measured in passenger-kilometers,
which is the distance traveled by passengers on buses. In addition, transportation is measured by
density of paved roads, which is number of kilometers of roads per 1,000 square kilometers. The
array of dependent variables was chosen to maximize the probability that regional political
leaders would have a significant impact on the provision of public goods. According to Kraan et
al. (2008), regional authorities in Russia oversee 49% of total expenditures on household
utilities, 59% of total expenditures on transportation, 56% of total expenditures on environmental
protection, 68% of the expenditures on health care, and 26% of total expenditures on primary
education.
The main independent variables of interest include a time dummy for whether a regional
governor was elected or appointed, a dummy for whether a regional governor belongs to the
treatment or control group, and an indicator for the governor’s pre- and post- law party
affiliation24. The time dummy takes a value of 1 for the years 2005-2012, and 0 for the years
2000-2004. There is no uniform data source for the governors’ party affiliation since UR does
not specify the accession of high-ranking officials to the party. As a result, I collected data on the
governors’ party affiliation directly from online news sources. The treatment dummy takes a
value of 1 if a governor changed his party affiliation to UR between 2005 and 2007, and 0 if he
has been affiliated with UR prior to 2005. Governors’ affiliation is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a regional governor is an official member of UR, or at least expresses a public
support for it, as determined by public news announcements, and 0 if he is a member of an

24

Since I employ those dummies to essentially measure recentralization of regional political institutions I avoid
using the share of sub-national revenues/expenditures in total revenues/expenditures, which often overestimates the
degree of fiscal autonomy (Stegarescu 2005).

22

opposition party or an independent candidate. The treatment effect of interest is expressed by the
interaction of the time dummy and the treatment dummy.
7. Results
I present estimation results for Equation (1) with education, healthcare, and environmental
outcomes as the dependent variable in Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

Table 2: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party on education

Party Change * Post
Socio-economic characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Log (enrollment rate)

(2)
Log (pupil/teacher)

0.012**
(0.005)
YES
0.636
511

-0.023
(0.018)
YES
0.787
579

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed party affiliation to UR in 2005-2008. All
regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The difference-in-differences estimator for party change has a positive and statistically
significant effect on enrollment rate in all public educational institutions. The coefficient on
enrollment rate indicates that regions where governors have changed their party affiliation to UR
after the new appointment law increased public school enrollment. A law induced change in
governor’s party affiliation from opposing to central party increases public school enrollment
rate by roughly 1 percent. This translates to a 0.8718 percentage point increase in enrollment or
2,000 additional enrolled students25.
The party affiliation effect on pupil to teacher ratio, column 2, yields a similar coefficient to
column 1, however it is insignificant. Statistical significance aside, the result is consistent with

25

The average enrollment rate and student enrollment for the control states during the pre-treatment period are 87.18
and 238,712, respectively.
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the hypothesis that for all regions in which the governor did not belong to the UR party prior to
2005, a governors’ centralized appointment after the new statue should be associated with an
increase in provision of public services with higher interregional spillover effects.
Column 1 in Table 3 shows that the difference-in-differences estimator for party change
takes a positive and significant value indicating that larger volumes of sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emissions occur in regions where governors changed their party affiliation from opposing to
central after 2004. According to point estimates, SO2 emissions increased by over 20 percent in
regions where governors had chosen to affiliate themselves with UR after the 2004 statue
changing the average SO2 particles emission level by roughly 4,000 tons.26 Coefficient on NO2
emissions is also positive, but statistically insignificant.

Table 3: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party on emissions

Party Change * Post
Socio-economic characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Log (SO2 emissions)

(2)
Log (NO2 emissions)

0.235*
(0.138)
YES
0.338
606

0.074
(0.097)
YES
0.076
613

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed party affiliation to UR in 2005-2008. All
regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The results in Table 3 do not support the argument for the beneficial effects of the presence
of centralized party on public services with interregional spillover effects. However,
environmental pollution is often correlated with economic activity. Previous research shows that
up to a certain level of per capita income, less than $8,000, growth in GDP might be associated

26

The average SO2 emissions for the control states during the pre-treatment period are 17.3 thousand tons.

24

with a decline in environmental conditions (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). As a result, any
potential reductions in SO2 emissions facilitated by presence of stronger central party would
have been offset by growth in production accompanied by heavy SO2 emissions.2728 Such
explanation is supported by negative and significant coefficient on unemployment rate in
specification (1), which indicates that a 1 percent increase in unemployment reduces SO2
emissions by over 3 percent29.
It is important to point out prior to interpreting results in Table 4 that the dependent variable
population to doctor ratio is more likely to be immediately impacted by changes in public
spending from a switch in political institutions than infant mortality (Enikolopov and
Zhyravskaya 2007).30 In addition, changes in public expenditures leading to new capital
investments in hospitals would affect infant mortality with a significant time lag. Thus, given the
relatively short time period of my analysis I expect to find stronger effects in the population to
doctor ratio regression.
Table 4: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party on healthcare

Party Change * Post
Socio-economic characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Infant mortality

(2)
Log (population/doctor)

-0.849*
(0.522)
YES
0.718
644

-0.018**
(0.009)
YES
0.401
709

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed party affiliation to UR in 2005-2008. All
regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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According to EPA, 73% of SO2 emissions result from fuel combustion at power plants, with remaining amount
produced by other industrial facilities.
28
Per capita GDP in Russia was under $8,000 during the sample time period (in 2000$).
29
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between logarithm of SO2 emissions and unemployment rate is -0.25, which
represents a weak negative relationship.
30
Infant mortality is likely a function of more than just democratic institutions. It may depend on specific population
characteristics, for which I do not have appropriate measures.
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Table 4 shows that regions where governors had changed their affiliation from the opposition
to the central party in 2005-2012 experience statistically significant reductions in infant mortality
as well as population-to-doctor ratio, which is consistent with the predicted relationship. Post2004 change in governor’s affiliation to UR reduced infant mortality by 0.85 deaths under the
age of 1 per 1,000 live births31. This translates into a 6 percent reduction in infant mortality.32
Similarly, the population-to-doctor ratio decreased by approximately 2 percent.
The estimation results for Equation (1) for public services without significant interregional
spillover effects are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party on public utilities
and transportation

Party Change * Post
Socio-economic
characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Log (heat
pc)

(2)
Log (sewage
pc)

(3)
Log (water
pc)

(4)
Log (road
volume)

(5)
Log (bus
volume)

-0.064
(0.083)

-0.073
(0.050)

-0.009
(0.031)

0.016
(0.032)

-0.102
(0.095)

YES
0.125
737

YES
0.395
676

YES
0.230
676

YES
0.634
724

YES
0.240
791

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed party affiliation to UR in 2005-2008. All
regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

None of the coefficients of interest illustrated in Table 5 are statistically significant, and all of
them are negative. Since the presence of strong central party is hypothesized to only affect the

31

Smaller coefficient on infant mortality may result from the fact that it responds to institutional changes as well as
any potential changes in public expenditures with a significant time lag (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007).
32
The average infant mortality for the control states during the pre-treatment period is 13.8 deaths under the age of 1
per 1,000 live births.
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provision of public services with higher interregional spillover effects through a better alignment
of regional and national interest, the results are expected. Estimation of Equation (1) in Table 5
confirms an earlier hypothesis that governors’ centralized appointment after the new law should
be associated with insignificant changes in provision of public services with low spillover effects
regardless of party affiliation.
Does the timing of affiliation change matter? That is, did states whose governors changed
their affiliation soon after 2004 fared better with respect to public services provision than states
whose governors changed their affiliation at a later point in time? Table 6 illustrates results for
Equation (1) estimations for public services with higher spillover effects. These estimations
include as a treatment group a sample of states that changed party affiliation from opposition to
central anytime during 2005-2012 as opposed to only during 2005-2008 as do Tables 2-5.33

Table 6: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party at any point in time
on public services with high spillover effects

Party Change *
Post
Socioeconomic
characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Log
(enrollment
rate)

(2)
Log
(pupil/
teacher)

-0.0005
(0.006)

YES
0.608
616

(3)

(5)

(6)

Infant
mortality

(4)
Log
(population/
doctor)

Log (SO2
emissions)

Log (NO2
emissions)

-0.031**
(0.013)

-0.833**
(0.415)

-0.004
(0.009)

0.132
(0.113)

0.100
(0.073)

YES
0.793
699

YES
0.689
779

YES
0.359
858

YES
0.306
742

YES
0.061
749

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed their party affiliation to UR at any point
between 2005 and 2012. All regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the state level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

33

Control group remains the same, i.e. governors that have been affiliated with the UR prior to 2004 law change.
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The conclusions derived from Table 6 are twofold. On the one hand, the coefficients for
enrollment rate, SO2 emissions, and population-to-doctor ratio lost their significance relative to
results reported in Tables 2-4. On the other hand, the estimator for infant mortality retains its
significance, and pupil-to-teacher ratio becomes significant relative to the results reported in
Tables 1 and 3. The coefficients imply that a change in party affiliation from opposition to
central at any time after the 2004 appointment statue is associated with a 3 percent decline in
pupil-to-teacher ratio, and close to a 6 percent decline in infant mortality. As a result, I did not
find consistent evidence that the timing of affiliation change has impacted the provision of all
analyzed public services with higher spillover effects in treatment states. Time effect appears to
be sensitive to the choice of the public service.
Estimation results for public services with low spillover effects indicate that the level of their
provision is not sensitive to the timing of a change in party affiliation as difference-in-differences
coefficients for all of them remain insignificant (see Table 23 in Appendix 1).
8. Conclusion
This study explores whether centralization of political power leads to similar levels of public
services provision as in the case of decentralization of political power by looking at the change in
political institutions that took place in the Russian Federation in 2004. Overall, the results
suggest that recentralization of political institutions does alter subnational levels of public
spending. However, the magnitude of the change depends on the type of public service and the
variation in region’s party affiliation before and after the countrywide switch to a more
centralized system of government. In line with Riker’s (1964) conclusions, I find that a strong
central party is an effective tool that aligns regional and national political interests, thus leading
to a higher degree of internalization of spillover effects from provision of certain public services.
Governors who change party affiliation from opposition to central after the 2004 law saw a
28

positive level effect in provisions of all analyzed public services with interregional spillover
effects in their respective states, except the environmental protection measures.
My results also support prior hypothesis that governors’ change in party affiliation from
opposition to central induced by the new appointment law had insignificant influence on level of
provision of public services without inter-regional spillover effects, suggesting, that the majority
party only expanded public provisions that benefits its goal of securing national votes.
Lastly, I did not find consistent evidence that the timing of a change in party affiliation from
opposition to central might have mattered for the resulting provision of public services with
higher interregional spillover effects.
What is the most direct policy implication on this study? Given potential underprovision of
public services with higher spillover effects, predicted by existing theoretical literature, it is
important to identify aspects of political institutions that can minimize the loss of interregional
spillover effects other than centralization of political institutions. I believe that this study
provides further evidence that strong central parties might act as important players in doing so.
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Chapter II: Charter Schools: Property Value Capitalization34
1. Introduction
Charter schools represent a special version of public schools that are allowed to be more
novel with their educational approach, while still being held accountable for student
achievement. Similar to traditional public schools, charter schools are open to all students,
charge no tuition, and have no particular enrollment requirements. Charter schools were designed
to improve US public school system as well as offer parents more choice in their children's
education. The number of charter schools in the United States has been on the rise since early
1990's. According to the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, the number of charter
schools in the US has increased from 1,500 in 1999-2000 school year to more than 6,000 in
2012-2013 school year. At the same time, the number of charter schools in Georgia increased
almost six-fold: from 18 in 1999-2000 to over 100 by 2012-2013.35 This growth in the number of
charter schools and enrollees is part of a larger trend in the United States towards more school
choice, which also includes inter- and intra-district choice programs, school voucher programs,
magnet schools, and private schools.
Evidence on changes in home values associated with school choice generally suggests home
buyers value it. Yet, previous research on the impact of charters schools on housing values
remains largely inconclusive with some studies finding positive effect (Shapiro and Hasset 2013,
Buerger 2014), while others finding no significant effect (Brehm et al. 2016, Horowitz et al.
2009). As a result, little is known about how the general public values the school choice option
of charter schools.

34

This essay is based on joint work with Carlianne Patrick of Georgia State University.
The number of charter schools in 2012-2013 does not include schools in a charter system, as they are not
comparable to the two types of charter schools included in the count by the National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools - conversion and start-up.
35
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We fill the void in the literature by analyzing charter schools with designated attendance
zones. The charter schools studies thus far have dispersed geographic attendance areas. It is
therefore possible that these charter schools do not create significant additional housing demand
in nearby neighborhoods, leading researchers to find no significant relationship. For example, in
Brehm et al. (2016) most charter schools in Los Angeles County are open to any student
regardless of where they reside. The same is true for the charter system in Lucas County, Ohio,
in Horowitz et al. (2009).
This paper exploits a unique feature of some charter schools in the metropolitan Atlanta area
to identify property value capitalization of charter schools. The charter schools in this study
designate small geographic areas within their attendance areas as priority zones. Students
applying for admission and residing within a charter school’s designated priority zones receive
admission offers with different probabilities. Priority one zone applicants have the highest
probability of admission, priority two zone applicants the next highest, and so on. This paper
estimates the capitalization effects of the increased charter school admission probability
conferred by location within priority one zones.
Our empirical strategy compares homes on either side of shared priority one and two zone
borders for the metropolitan Atlanta charter schools with priority zones. We present estimates
identified by the difference in pre- and post- opening sales prices for priority zone one and two
homes within the same border area as well as a repeat sales specification. Our results indicate
that prices rose by six to seven percent for priority one zone homes compared to priority two
zone homes after the opening of a new charter school. We also find that the priority one zone
capitalization increases as the home’s traditional public school performs worse.
Our results indicate that families value the school choice in the form of charter schools since
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they are willing to pay a premium to live in neighborhoods with increased charter schools
admission probability. This study presents the strongest evidence on the importance of charter
schools' accessibility to local communities so far.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature
on the effects of school choice on residential property values, and describes in detail the sample
of charter schools in our analysis. Section 3 lays out the empirical approach, and describes data.
Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
Charter schools are publicly funded alternatives to traditional public schools in their
attendance areas and are a form of school choice. Parents choose whether to enroll their students
in their designated traditional public school or to send their student(s) to a charter school if they
reside in the schools attendance area. Charter schools are managed by independent operators
under a contract with the local authorizing agency, typically the local school board or state
educational agency. They are permitted substantially more operational and programmatic
flexibility than traditional public schools. For examples, charter schools may require longer
school days than permitted under traditional public school regulation or deviate from state
mandated curriculum. In a sense, charter schools operate similarly to private schools. The
differences between charter schools and private schools are two-fold. Charter school attendance
is publicly-funded and charter schools exchange their increased flexibility for increased
accountability. Charter schools are subject to public oversight and are typically governed by a
board of parents and teachers. Charter contracts may be revoked if governing or oversight
entities determine the school underperforms with respect to student achievement.
Although there is a substantial literature on charter schools and student outcomes, there is
little evidence on the relationship between charter schools and property values. There is a long
32

history of research documenting the capitalization of school quality and public investments into
property values (Brunner et al. 2012, Chung 2015, Reback 2005, Schwartz et al. 2014, Brunner
and Sonstelie 2003, Nechyba 2000, Fack and Grenet 2010, Cannon et al. 2015, Merrifield et al.
2011, Bonilla et al. 2015, Walden 1990, Brehm et al. 2016, Shapiro and Hasset 2013, Buerger
2014, Horowitz et al. 2009, Billings et al. 2014). If households value the charter school option,
charter schools improve traditional public school performance, or charter schools represent a
significant investment in valuable public facilities, then it would be reasonable to expect charter
schools to have an effect on property values as well. The notion that charters influence property
values through their option value or through their effect on traditional public schools is supported
by a number of studies that find various forms of school choice significantly affect property
values in the areas in which they are implemented.
2.1 School Choice and Property Values
School choice comes in a variety of forms. Inter- and intra-district programs allow parents to
choose an alternative traditional public school from the one servicing the attendance area in
which the household resides. Voucher programs, also known as opportunity scholarships, are
state-funded programs that provide students with an opportunity to attend private schools by
paying some portion of their tuition (National Conference of State Legislatures). Magnet schools
represent type of public schools with a concentration in certain curricula, such as STEM, Fine
and Performing Arts, International Studies, World Languages, etc. (Magnet Schools of America).
Finally, private schools are non-state funded schools that charge tuition. They are exempt from
many government regulations that apply to other school choice options.
Studies evaluating the impact of inter- and intra-district choice establish that property values
reflect households’ positive valuation of access to better performing schools, but also that choice
decreases the premium associated with living in the best performing school attendance areas.
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Brunner et al. (2012) evaluate twelve states that have passed legislation mandating inter-district
school choice by 1998. They show that districts in close proximity to desirable out-of-district
public school options have experienced a significant increase in residential property values.
Chung (2015) analyzes both inter- and intra-district schools choice programs in Seoul area. He
discovered that they led to a decrease in housing values in better-performing school districts by
10-27% relative to housing values in worse-performing school districts. Echoing Chung’s
predictions, Reback (2005) documents that inter-district schools choice in Minnesota led to
property values increasing in school districts where students are able to transfer to a different
school, but decreasing in those school districts that are accepting a lot of transferring students.
Finally, Schwartz et al. (2014) show that general availability of the school choice in New York
City prior to 2003 increased property values by 2.2%.
The literature on school voucher programs documents a similar relationship, with property
values reflecting households’ positive valuation of choice and a decline in the premium for
superior quality schools. This research highlights a positive relationship between voucher
programs and residential property values, particularly in districts looking to take the biggest
advantage of the voucher-enabled access to better schools. Brunner and Sonstelie (2003)
evaluate 2000 voucher initiative in California. They find that it led to a decline in property values
in areas with superior public schools, and an increase in property values in areas with inferior
public schools. Nechyba (2000) shows that universal vouchers for private schools located in lowincome districts lead to an increase in housing prices in those districts due to the migration of
high- and middle-income families looking to take advantage of relatively lower housing prices.
Nechyba argues that vouchers for private schools located in lower-income districts in essence
diminished existing positive relationship between public school quality and property values.
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Fack and Grenet (2010) make a similar statement having evaluated the effect of private schools
on housing values in surrounding neighborhoods in Paris, France. Cannon et al. (2015) evaluate
a schools choice system in Vermont. They find that areas offering tuition vouchers experienced
an increase in residential property values by anywhere from 3 to 16% depending on the school
quality. Finally, Merrifield et al. (2011) analyze the effect of temporary tuition voucher program
in Edgewood Independent School District, San Antonio, Texas. The tuition program increased
residential home transaction values by almost 10% during its early years, and by 1% during its
final years.
The magnet school alternative to traditional public schools also appears to have a similar
effect on property values. Increased access to the magnet school alternative is positively
capitalized into property values. Bonilla et al. (2015) show that higher probability of admission
to Chicago magnet schools for students living within the 1.5-mile radius of a magnet school
made possible in 1997 increased housing values in those areas by 5.4%. In addition, premium on
properties located in close proximity to multiple magnet schools is even higher. Echoing
Nechyba (2000) and Fack and Grenet (2010), Walden (1990) demonstrates that presence of a
magnet school in Wake County, North Carolina, reduced the capitalized value of traditional
public schools quality in the school district, especially for elementary schools. Thus, by
decoupling access from residential location, magnet schools change the relationship between
public school quality and property values. Finally, Billings et al. (2014) evaluate the
consequences No Child Left Behind policy for Charlotte, North Carolina school district, where
students attending consistently failing schools get an opportunity to enroll in high-quality, oversubscribed schools, including magnet schools. Their results indicate that higher-income families
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are willing to pay more for houses in highest quality neighborhoods within the attendance
boundaries of failing schools.
Charter schools similarly introduce an alternative choice to traditional public schools. In the
studies that are most closely related to ours, researchers estimate property value capitalization of
charter schools without catchment areas or with dispersed geographic attendance areas (Brehm et
al. 2016, Shapiro and Hasset 2013, Buerger 2014, and Horowitz et al. 2009). Brehm et al. (2016)
and Horowitz et al. (2009) find no significant relationship between charter schools and housing
values. Specifically, Brehm et al. (2016) and Horowitz et al. (2009) document no positive effect
of charter schools on residential property values in Los Angeles County, California, and Lucas
County, Ohio, respectively. These studies suggest the option value created by charter school
choice differs from the school choice initiatives discussed above. On the contrary, Shapiro and
Hasset (2013) show that the expansion of charter schools in New York City between 2002 and
2013 increased property values by 3.84% at the zip code level. Buerger (2014) also finds that
charter penetration in upstate New York had a positive impact on housing prices. The New York
studies indicate choice is positively capitalized when charter schools are the alternative, similar
to the findings for other forms of school choice.
The mixed evidence on the relationship between charter schools and property values could be
attributable to the nature of charter schools and their perceived value as an alternative. It could
also arise from the offsetting effects of increased values associated with choice and changes in
the relationship between property values and school quality. Our analysis focuses on charter
schools with a unique feature tying residential location with access to the charter school. As
discussed in detail below, we examine charter schools with well-defined attendance areas and
small, geographic areas designated for priority admissions within those attendance areas. Similar
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to the aforementioned Bonilla et al (2015) study of Chicago magnet schools, these priority zones
are associated with differential probability of gaining admission to the charter school. We focus
on homes located within close proximity to the border between priority one and two zones,
thereby minimizing the potentially countervailing effects of underlying changes in the
relationship between traditional school performance and the introduction of school choice
through charter school openings.
2.2 Metro Atlanta Charter School Priority Zones
There are three types of charter schools in Georgia: conversion, start-ups, and schools in a
charter system. The latter are relatively new and unique to Georgia. As such they are not
included in our analysis and our results should not be extrapolated to schools in charter systems.
Conversion and start-up charter schools operate under contracts with State that specify the school
enrollment cap, attendance zones – the geographic area from which students may be drawn – and
enrollments priorities. In Georgia, charters schools may also define priority zones within the
charter’s designated attendance zone. The designation of priority zones confers different
probabilities of gaining admittance to a charter school to different geographic areas within the
school’s attendance area. Conversion charters are existing traditional public schools that convert
to a charter school after a vote by the faculty and parents. Priority one status for conversion
charters is therefore generally the attendance boundary designated by the local school board,
with the local school district comprising the attendance zone. Start-up charters, as the name
implies, did not exist prior to being authorized and are created by a petition brought forth by
individuals, private organizations, or a state or local public entity. Start-up charters have
substantial flexibility in setting attendance areas and priority zones. Only a small subset of
Georgia schools designate priority zones and currently all that do so are located in the
metropolitan Atlanta area and either Fulton or DeKalb Counties. They are also located within
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one of three local public school districts - Atlanta Public School District, Fulton County School
District, or DeKalb County School District.
Table 24 in Appendix 2 details the priority zones, year opened, and grades served by each of
the thirteen metropolitan Atlanta charter schools with priority zones. Kingsley Charter
Elementary and North Springs Charter High School are both conversion charter schools and the
remaining schools are start-up schools. The Atlanta Neighborhood Charter Schools, Charles
Drew Charter School, and The Museum at Avondale Estates were created through local parentdriven initiatives. KIPP, a nationwide charter school organization, worked with local parents to
open its six metro Atlanta charters. The start-up charter school priority zones do not necessarily
align with local school attendance boundaries. For example, the priority one zone for KIPP
STRIVE Academy is the 30310 zip code -- a relatively arbitrary boundary in terms of variation
in neighborhood and housing attributes.
Figure 2 maps the priority one zone for each of the charter schools listed in Table 24. It
should be clear that charter schools do not locate at random. The schools vary in their origins as
well as their target populations. Location choice and priority attendance areas reflect this
variation. The KIPP schools, for example, are clustered near one another, both because of
economies of scale in management from the national organization and because target populations
are clustered in that area. The non-random nature of charter school location creates a challenge
for identifying their capitalization into property values. Figure 3 depicts the annual mean sales
price for priority one zone single-family residential, fair market value sales as well as the mean
for Fulton and DeKalb Counties. It reveals that a naive comparison of priority one zone property
values would likely suggest negative capitalization attributable to charter school priority zones
disproportionately located in lower value areas.
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Figure 2: Priority zone map - Atlanta metro area
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Figure 3: Annual mean sales price comparison - priority one zone, Fulton County and DeKalb
County

It is for this reason that our analysis focuses on properties located close to the border between
priority one and two zones for each charter school. The priority one and two zones for DeKalb
Path Academy are not adjacent, but otherwise priority two zones share a border with the priority
one zones. We use that shared border to identify properties treated with priority one status and
counterfactual properties as nearby homes with priority two status. DeKalb PATH is therefore
removed from our analysis. In some cases, priority one zones for different charter schools
overlap. We discuss how we address those areas in more detail in the data section below.
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As discussed above, priority zones confer different probabilities of gaining admission to the
charter school. Charter schools set enrollment caps that dictate the maximum number of students
per grade level. Returning students, siblings of returning students, children of full-time
employees, and children of governing board members typically receive first priority in allocating
available slots in each grade. Although there is some variation across schools, the remaining
available slots are filled by priority one zone applicants, priority two zone applicants, and so on.
If there are more applicants than available slots, then a random lottery determines which
applicants receive offers of admission. The following summarizes this process (Patrick 2015):
i) If applications for students residing within the priority one zone exceed available slots,
then a random lottery selects applicants from priority one zone applicants only. All applicants
living within the priority two zone are waitlisted, with waitlist order determined by random
lottery.
ii) If applications from students residing within the priority one zone do not exceed available
slots but the combined number of priority one and two applicants does, then either
a. Priority one applicants receive offers of admission and a lottery determines admission
offers and waitlist order for priority two applicants; or,
b. Priority one and two applicants are pooled in the lottery to determine admission offers
and waitlist order.
iii) If priority one and two applicants do not exceed available slots but the total number of
applicants from the designated attendance area exceeds available slots, then priority one and two
applicants receive offers of admission. A random lottery determines admission offers and waitlist
priorities for remaining applicants.
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The admission probability conferred by living in the priority zones varies by school, grade,
and year. Kingsley Charter Elementary School and North Springs Charter High School are
outliers in this process because they are conversion charters. Priority one zone students are
guaranteed admission. Zone two applicants may receive admission offers by lottery until the
enrollment cap.36 The admission probability associated with living in the priority one zone is
therefore one and less than one for priority two zone residents.
Similarly, Figure 2 reveals that the start-up charter school Charles Drew priority one zone
covers a very small geographic area. There are, consequently, a small number of households in
the Charles Drew Charter School priority one zone relative to the average number of available
slots below the enrollment cap. The Charles Drew admission process implies a probability of one
for zone one applicants. The probability for Drew priority two zone two residents varies from
year to year, with Drew reporting no lottery for the 2009-2010 school year (implying a
probability of one) and lotteries in subsequent years (implying a probability of less than one).37
Thus, at least in expectation, there is a discrete change in probability for households in Drew
priority zones one and two.
Atlanta Neighborhood Charter Schools (ANCS), on the other hand, report regularly receiving
more applicants from priority one zone students than available slots in some grade-years. As
noted above, a lottery determines which zone one applicants receive admission offers when there
are more applicants from zone one than available slots. In this case, the zone one admissions
probability is less than one (for oversubscribed grade-years) and zero for priority two zone
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According to information provided by the school, Kingsley has not had available lottery slots for zone two
applicants in recent years. The conversion of North Springs Charter High School to a school in a charter system
(from a conversion charter school) that began last year eliminates zone two effective probabilities of admission
outside the magnet programs.
37
For example, the 2014-2015 Pre-K lottery admitted 108 applicants and waitlisted 168, implying an acceptance
probability of 0.39.
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applicants. In other grade-years, ANCS did not received more applicants from zone one than
available slots. In this case, all zone one and two applicants are pooled in the lottery, with equal
probability of being chosen. Parents cannot know a priori whether there will be more applicants
for their student’s grade level from zone one than available slots. The expected probability of
admission for ANCS zone one applicants therefore is higher than the expected probability for
zone two applicants, but still less than one.
3. Empirical Implementation
3.1 Empirical Strategy
As noted above, charter school priority zones are not randomly located across space and
potential for biased estimates arise to the extent that unobservable attributes of the homes or
neighborhoods determining treatment (charter school priority zone designation) also influences
sale price. Our empirical strategy minimizes this risk by comparing the change in sale prices for
homes located within close proximity to the border between priority zones one and two. Homes
located near the shared border should be similar with respect to unobservable attributes such as
access to employment opportunities, transportation networks, parks, shopping and dining, the
neighbors with whom residents interact, etc. It is reasonable to expect that homes become more
similar as they become closer in space. Defining “close” as a very small distance from the border
therefore has the advantage of comparing similar homes, but at the cost of decreased sample
sizes and loss of information from other home sales in the area. Our primary results define
“close” as being within 0.3 miles of the shared border, which we believe balances the trade-off
between minimizing unobserved heterogeneity and sample size. We also present estimates for
“close” defined as 0.1 miles and 0.5 miles.
We are interested in the “causal” or “capitalization” effect of the increased probability of
gaining admission to the charter school conferred by being located in a priority one zone. We
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therefore adopt a standard strategy in the literature and estimate the following hedonic
difference-in-differences for the change in the log of sales price y for single-family house i
border area j at time t:
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 ′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1(𝑃𝑍1)𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅1(𝜏 > 0)𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃[1(𝑃𝑍1)𝑖𝑗 × 1(𝜏 > 0)𝑗𝑡 ] + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2)
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observable characteristics of house i, 𝛼𝑗 is a vector of border area
indicator variables, 𝜇𝑡 is a vector of quarter-year fixed effects, 1(𝑃𝑍1)𝑖𝑗 is an indicator variable
equal to one for homes located on the priority zone one side of shared border j, 1(𝜏 > 0)𝑗𝑡 is an
indicator equal to one indicator for t being after the charter school opened, and 𝜏 is year
normalized such that 𝜏 = 0 in the charter school opening year for each school.
Our parameter of interest is 𝜃, the average change in sale prices for priority one zone homes
after the charter school opening, which we refer to as the capitalization effect. This effect is
identified by comparing the difference in pre- and post- opening sales prices for priority zone
one and two homes within the same border area while controlling for observable characteristics
and common quarter-year shocks to sale prices.
Threats to identification arise to the extent that the specification does not account for
unobservables correlated with sales price and treatment (priority one zone status and charter
school openings). Our vector of observable characteristics includes measures of house size, lot
size, bathrooms, bedrooms, age, condition of the home, fireplaces, garages, and recent
renovation. It also includes measures for the number of nearby distressed transactions within the
last six months. The border area fixed effects control for other unobservable characteristics such
as access to employment opportunities, transportation networks, parks, shopping and dining, the
neighbors with whom residents interact, etc. The priority one zone indicator absorbs
unobservables common across areas designated as priority one zones (as opposed to priority
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two). Unobservables may still pose a threat, though, through at least three channels.
The first channel is through unobservable differences in house characteristics. In particular,
the concern is that the sample of sales in the post-treatment areas (or, equivalently, in the
counterfactual areas or pre-treatment period) is composed of homes with unusually high or low
values of these unobservable characteristics. This “sample selection” problem, as it is commonly
referred to in the literature, introduces the potential for omitted variable bias that is typically
addressed by using repeat sales (McMillen 2012). We follow the literature and our primary
results use a repeat sales version of Equation (2). We present the repeat sales estimates alongside
estimates from Equation (2) to allay any concerns that homes selling multiple times during the
sample period may not be representative of typical homes in the area.
Recent critiques of the hedonic difference-in-difference estimation identify a second channel
through which unobservables may threaten identification of 𝜃 as the capitalization effect of
treatment– changing hedonic price functions over time or as a result of treatment (Klaiber and
Smith 2013; Kuminoff and Pope 2014). Hedonic equilibria occur across space within a single
time period. Hedonic difference-in-differences therefore compare prices from two (or more)
equilibria in which treatment or changes in the underlying economic environment may have
altered the hedonic price function (Banzhaf 2015). Critiques of hedonic difference-indifferences suggest the resulting estimates do not identify the capitalization effect because they
mix information from two (or more) equilibria and information on treatment. More recently,
Banzhaf (2015) provides fairly weak conditions under which difference-in-differences hedonic
estimates identify the direct (unmediated) effect of treatment. It is this effect that we will refer to
as the capitalization effect of priority one zone increases in the probability of charter school
admission.
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We estimate capitalization using a repeated cross-section of single-family, residential homes
or repeated sales of single-family, residential homes. Our data do not provide detailed
characteristics on the home buyers. Bayer et al (2007) poignantly demonstrate that households
sort across borders in response to changes in school quality and that estimates of willingness-topay for school quality include the value of school quality as well as the value of changes in
resident characteristics. If neighborhood composition changes in response to priority one zone
status after charter school openings, then our capitalization estimates also include changes in
price associated with neighbors who also value increased admission probability.
3.2 Data
The housing price data cover all transactions from 1990 to 2010 for Fulton and DeKalb
counties in Georgia, all parts of Atlanta metro area. As discussed above, we chose Georgia as our
study sample because its charter schools have designated priority attendance zones, a
characteristic that sets out sample of charter schools apart from samples used in previous studies.
We use elementary, middle and high schools.
Figure 2 represents part of the Atlanta metro area used in our analysis. Using Fulton and
DeKalb counties’ parcel data, which include geographic coordinates, we matched housing
transactions to charter schools’ priority zones.
As mentioned in section 2.2, the following charter schools are included in the analysis:
Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School (middle and elementary campuses), Charles R. Drew
Charter School, KIPP South Fulton Academy, KIPP STRIVE Academy and Primary, KIPP
Vision Academy and Primary, and KIPP WAYS Academy, the Museum School of Avondale
Estates, Kingsley Charter Elementary School, and North Springs Charter High School. The
charter schools for the analysis were selected based on whether they had at least two priority
attendance zones. The priority zones were determined from the approved charters for schools
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provided by the Georgia Department of Education. The maps were obtained as either JPEG or
PDF files directly from schools’ websites, or provided as GIS shapefiles by the Atlanta Regional
Commission.
We generated buffer areas on each side of the border between priority zones 1 and 2 of each
charter school in the sample. We created 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 mile buffers for each set of priority
zones. Figure 4 represent an example of charter schools priority zones and corresponding buffers
in our sample.

Figure 4: Example of charter school priority zones and corresponding buffers

We exclude all single-family residences located in more than one charter school priority one
zone as they are not immediately comparable to the rest of the houses in the sample. For
example, in Figure 5 part of the Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School middle campus priority
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zone 1 overlaps with the KIPP Vision Academy priority zone 1. As a result, families residing in
properties located at the intersection of two priority zones, indicated by green dots, are eligible
for acceptance into either Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School (ANCS) middle school, or KIPP
Vision Academy, which is also a middle school. Not only are homes in these areas treated with
more than one charter school priority one zone, the counterfactuals in the border areas are also
treated with priority one zone admission probabilities from another charter school. We exclude
3,327 single-family, residential fair market sales that occur from 1990-2015 in the overlapping
priority one zone 0.3 mile border areas.

Figure 5: Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School priority zone 1 and KIPP Vision Academy
priority zone 1
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The housing price data comes from DataQuick. The sample within 0.3 miles of the priority
one and two zone borders consists of 28,654 single-family residences within 10 charter schools’
attendance boundaries. The sample of repeated sales consists of 22,860 single-family residences
within the attendance boundaries of the same 10 charter schools. Table 7 summarizes the data.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics

0.5 miles
Total

0.3 miles

Repeated Sales Only

Total

0.1 miles

Repeated Sales Only

Total

Repeated Sales Only

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

Bedrooms

3.00

0.82

2.96

0.81

2.96

0.81

2.92

0.79

2.89

0.81

2.86

0.79

Bathrooms

1.99

1.02

1.93

0.98

1.94

0.99

1.88

0.94

1.84

0.92

1.78

0.87

House price

178,579

168,302

175,098

157,283

177,360

161,292

174,390

147,254

163,142

150,133

158,338

135,816

House size (sqft)

1,711

874

1,658

822

1,669

841

1,619

781

1,565

742

1,516

662

Lot Size (sqft)

13,105

11,313

12,225

9,993

12,252

10,860

11,385

9,437

10,943

10,160

10,147

8,401

House below average

0.03

0.17

0.03

0.16

0.03

0.17

0.03

0.16

0.02

0.15

0.02

0.14

House above average

0.13

0.34

0.15

0.36

0.13

0.34

0.15

0.36

0.14

0.34

0.15

0.36

Fireplace

0.51

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.48

0.50

0.47

0.50

0.43

0.50

0.42

0.49

Garage

0.12

0.33

0.12

0.32

0.11

0.31

0.11

0.31

0.10

0.31

0.09

0.29

Age of building

44.40

26.60

46.69

26.70

46.77

27.06

49.10

27.16

49.01

27.39

51.42

27.14

Distress m1

41.76

53.60

44.92

55.01

44.03

53.82

46.94

54.79

47.30

54.14

49.86

54.90

Distress m5

12.97

18.65

13.94

19.24

13.76

19.22

14.65

19.69

15.48

20.51

16.27

20.87

Distress m25

3.95

6.23

4.25

6.43

4.16

6.46

4.42

6.62

4.66

6.83

4.88

6.92

Renovations

0.05

0.22

0.06

0.23

0.06

0.23

0.06

0.24

0.08

0.26

0.09

0.28

N

43,730

33,785

28,654
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22,860

9,138

7,453

The mean housing price in the full sample is $177,360, with a standard deviation of
$161,292. The mean housing price in the repeated sales sample is $174,390, with a standard
deviation of $147,254. We control for other housing characteristics such as number of bedrooms
and bathrooms, house and lot square footage, age of the building, presence of fireplace and
garage, presence of recent renovations, number of distress transactions in close proximity, and
dummy variables for whether the house is in below, at, or above the average condition as
determined by the county assessor. Table 7 also shows descriptive statistics for two subsamples
of single-family residences located inside the 0.5-mile buffer, and 0.1-mile buffer of the 10
charter schools attendance boundaries.
It is plausible that homebuyers will value eligibility for charter school enrollment even more
if it resides in the attendance zone of a relatively underperforming traditional public school. To
test this notion, we add an interaction between [1(𝑃𝑍1)𝑖𝑗 × 1(𝜏 > 0)𝑗𝑡 ] and a measure for the
quality of homes’ traditional public schools to our empirical specification. We spatially match
each housing transaction to its designated public elementary, middle, and high schools. School
attendance boundaries change over time and we obtained data on the boundary changes directly
from the local school districts. Our proxies for school quality are Criterion-Referenced
Competency Tests (CRCT) in English, Reading, and Math for elementary and middle schools,
and End of Course Tests (EOCT) in Algebra and English Composition for high schools from
2004 to 2013.38 CRCT was a state-wide assessment performed every year on students in grades 1
through 8. EOCT was largely used for high school accountability assessment. We acquired
CRCT and EOCT results from the Georgia Governor’s Office of Student Achievement for every

38

Both CRCT and EOCT programs were discontinued at the end of the 2013-2014 school year, and replaced with
Georgia Milestones Assessment System (Georgia Department of Education). We were unable to get test results prior
to 2004.
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public school in Fulton and DeKalb counties. Specifically, the data show the mean percent of
students who did not meet state standards, mean percent of students who met the state standards,
and mean percent of students who exceeded the state standards in a particular subject. CRCT
means were calculated across grades in elementary and middle schools, grades 3 through 5 and 6
through 8, respectively. EOCT means were calculated across grades in high schools (grades 9
through 12). In addition, the data delineate CRCT and EOCT results by race and income. All
performance means were calculated at the school level. The school performance indicator is
assigned to housing transactions for the traditional public school servicing the same grade level
as the charter school for the transaction. For example, the performance measure for homes within
the KIPP Vision Academy boundary area is the performance for the middle school that students
in that home would otherwise attend. In practice, we present results for performance measured as
the percentage of all, black, and economically disadvantaged students failing to meet math
standards. Results using measures for reading and literature were quantitatively and qualitatively
similar.
4. Results
Table 8 presents the estimated change in single-family, residential home sale price in priority
one zones after the corresponding charter school opening as compared to the change in price for
homes in priority two zones within the same 0.3 mile border area. Column (1) reports the
hedonic difference-in-differences estimator 𝜃 from Equation (2). Column (2) adds additional city
and county fixed effects to Equation (2). Column (3) contains the results from the repeat sales
specification. The Table 8 estimates indicate sales prices increased for homes with the greater
probability of charter school admission conferred by priority one zone status. The repeat sales
estimated increase of 8.86% (Column 3) is slightly larger than the 7.26% increase from
estimating Equation (2). This suggests that homes with slightly lower valued unobservables may
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comprise a larger share of post-period sales; however, the difference appears slight and the
change for our sample of repeat sales resemble the typical homes in the area. As noted above, the
repeat sales estimator removes “sample selection” concerns and is therefore our preferred
estimate.

Table 8: Estimated priority zone one capitalization within 0.3 mile border areas
PZ1 Capitalization
Housing Characteristics
Distress Measures
Border Area FE
Quarter-Year FE
City/County FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
0.0726***
(0.0180)
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
27,319
0.593

(2)
0.0535***
(0.0182)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
27,319
0.598

(3)
0.0886***
(0.0221)
N
Y
N
Y
N
21,767
0.783

Notes: The table presents results from three separate regressions. Column (1) is the hedonic
difference-in-differences for priority one zone sales prices after charter school opening compared
to priority two zone home sales in the same 0.3 mile border area. Column (2) adds additional city
and county fixed effects to the Column (1) specification. Column (3) contains the results from
the repeat sales difference-in-differences specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Given the mean pretreatment sales price for priority one zone homes within 0.3 miles of the
border, Table 8 suggests priority one zone prices increased by $8,845-$13,470 in the periods
following charter school openings. If homebuyers spend more for priority one zone homes, it
implies that households value the choice, flexibility, and accountability that characterize charter
schools. In this context, it is important to note that the change in priority one zone sale prices is
being compared to the change in priority two zone prices. Households in priority two zones lie
within the charter school attendance areas and therefore also have access to the charter school.
The difference in access is the difference in the probability of charter school admission
associated. As we discussed in the Section 3.1, it is possible that households differentially sort
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along the priority zone border after the charter school opening. It is therefore possible that Table
2 estimates the increase for increased charter school admission probabilities and the type of
neighbors that value them.
Table 9 reports the variation in estimated capitalization effects across border areas of 0.1
(Panel A), 0.3 (Panel B), and 0.5 miles (Panel C), respectively. Columns (1) and (2) in each
Panel contain the within border area difference-in-differences hedonic and repeat sales estimates,
respectively. Table 9 indicates property values significantly increased between 5 and 9.5 percent
in priority one zones after charter school openings, which is fairly consistent with the Table 8
results. It should be noted that statistically significant capitalization effects disappear in the 0.1
mile border area for repeat sales (Panel A, Column 2); however, this could be attributable to
small sample size.

Table 9: Estimated priority zone one capitalization within 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 mile border areas

PZ1 Capitalization
Housing Characteristics
Distress Measures
Border Area FE
Quarter-Year FE
Observations
R-squared

Panel A: 0.1 miles
(1)
(2)
0.0699** 0.0081
(0.0343) (0.0429)
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
8,054
6,454
0.578
0.768

Panel B: 0.3 miles
(1)
(2)
0.0726*** 0.0886***
(0.0180)
(0.0221)
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
27,319
21,767
0.593
0.783

Panel C: 0.5 miles
(1)
(2)
0.0472*** 0.0953***
(0.0140)
(0.0174)
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
44,598
35,031
0.592
0.783

Notes: The table presents results from six separate regressions. Panels A, B, and C correspond to
different 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 mile border areas, respectively. Panel A, B, and C Columns (1) report
the hedonic difference-in-differences for priority one zone sales prices after charter school
opening compared to priority two zone home sales in the same 0.3 mile border area. Column (2)
contains the results from the repeat sales difference-in-differences specification. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Tables 8 and 9 employ data from all available years, 1990-2010. As discussed in Section 3.2,
the sales have been limited to single-family, residential fair market value transactions whenever
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possible, but early sales in some jurisdictions without sale type information have been retained.
Table 10 presents results for repeat sales after removing any early transactions for which sale
type could not be verified. Column (1) contains estimates using all available years analogous to
those in Tables 8 and 9. Column (2) limits the pre- and post-period window to four years.
Column (3) employs repeat sales within six years before or after the charter school opening.
Panels A and B present results for the 0.3 and 0.5 mile border areas, respectively. The estimated
capitalization effect ranges from 6-10% in Table 10.

Table 10: Restricted sample, repeat sales estimated capitalization by time window

PZ1 Capitalization
Observations
R-squared

Panel A: 0.3 mile
(1)
(2)
(3)
All Years
4 Years
6 Years
0.0739**
0.0981*
0.0672
(0.0313)
(0.0547)
(0.0425)
16,154
7,995
10,838
0.801
0.862
0.821

Panel B: 0.5 mile
(1)
(2)
(3)
All Years
4 Years
6 Years
0.0617***
0.0788*
0.0630**
(0.0235)
(0.0406)
(0.0321)
26,214
12,837
17,482
0.802
0.867
0.826

Notes: The table presents results from six separate repeat sales regressions with quarter-year
fixed effects and distress measures for the restricted sample of early sales. Panels A and B
correspond to different the 0.3 and 0.5 mile border areas, respectively. Panel A and B Columns
(1) uses all periods of available restricted data. Column (2) contains the results from repeat sales
occurring within four years before or after the charter school opening. Column (3) expands the
time window to six years before or after the charter school opening. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The effect of removing the unverified early sales from the sample can be gleaned by
comparing Table 10 with the analogous estimates in Table 9. It has little effect on the 0.3 mile
estimates, decreasing the estimates from 8.86 percent (Table 9, Panel B, Column 2) to 7.39
percent (Table 10 Panel A Column 1). The decrease a bit more pronounced for the 0.5 mile
border area estimates, decreasing the capitalization effect from 9.5 percent (Table 9, Panel C,
Column 2) to 6.17 percent (Table 10, Panel B, Column 1).
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Looking across the columns within each panel in Table 10 reveals some variation in
capitalization effects across time. Price increases are larger when the sample is limited to repeat
sales within four years before and after the charter school opening (Columns 2) than when the
sample contains repeat sales within longer time windows. The six year window estimates
(Column 3), however, closely resemble the estimates using all periods, suggesting the initial
boost in property values levels out to a sustained priority one zone capitalization effect of
approximately 6-7 percent compared to priority two zone homes.
Recall that our estimates compare home sales on either side of the priority one and two zone
border. The homes have access to the charter schools with different probabilities, but both treated
and control groups are within the charter school attendance boundaries. While estimated positive
capitalization effect suggest household value the choice associated with charter schools, our
results are identified from the discrete change in admission probability at the border. Taken
together, the estimates in Tables 8-10 suggest that households value the increased probability of
admission to charter schools associated with being located in priority one zones and, perhaps, the
change in neighborhood resident composition associated with priority one zone status. Since our
sample of residential properties is located near the shared border, and in close geographic
proximity, the houses on each side of that border should be relatively similar with respect to
unobservable neighborhood characteristics. As a result, we can argue that housing premiums
associated with zone one are predominantly driven by the increased probability of charter school
enrollment.
Table 11 presents results for the change in capitalization associated with traditional school
performance for repeat sales within 0.3 mile border areas. The specification includes the priority
one zone capitalization estimated above as well an interaction term between the priority one zone
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post-opening indicator and a measure of school quality. We exclude charter schools with opening
dates prior to 2003 because performance data was unavailable prior to the 2003-2004 school
year. School quality is measured by the percentage of all, black, and economically disadvantaged
students failing to meet math standards, in Columns (1) – (3), respectively. As noted in the data
section, results using reading and literature were similar.

Table 11: Change in capitalization associated with traditional school performance for repeat sales
within 0.3 mile border areas

PZ1 Capitalization
PZ1-School Quality Interaction
Observations
R-squared

(1)
All Students
0.125**
(0.0546)
0.0038***
(0.0013)
16,476
0.778

(2)
Black Students
0.136***
(0.0527)
0.0034***
(0.0012)
16,476
0.778

(3)
Disadvantaged Students
0.120**
(0.0541)
0.0039***
(0.0012)
16,476
0.778

Notes: The table presents results from three separate repeat sales regressions with quarter-year
fixed effects and distress measures for the sample of single-family residential sales within 0.3
miles of shared priority one and two zone borders. School quality is measured by the percentage
of all, black, and economically disadvantaged students failing to meet math standards, in
Columns (1) – (3), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.

Table 11 indicates that capitalization is stronger for homes with underperforming traditional
public schools. One percent increase in the number of students failing to meet math standards
increases priority one zone sales prices by 0.4 percent after the charter school opens (Table 11,
Column 1). Consistent with previous studies of school choice capitalization, charter schools
appear to increase demand and/or change the type of residents buying homes in areas with
struggling traditional public schools. Measuring performance by the percentage of black or
economically disadvantaged students failing to meet math standards, Columns (2) and (3),
respectively, produces similar estimated effects.
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5. Conclusion
Do families value charter schools? Our results suggest that they do. We use a unique
characteristic of ten charter schools in the Atlanta metro area to study whether households are
willing to pay a premium for a house located in priority on zone as opposed to priority two zone.
Even though students residing in either priority zone are eligible to attend corresponding charter
school, the probability of enrollment is substantially larger for the residents of priority zone one.
Our identification strategy is based on the differences in sales prices for homes in priority one
and two zones before and after the opening of a charter school. We find that parents are willing
to pay about 6%-8% - or $8,845-$13,470 – more for houses located in priority zone one within
0.3 miles from the border, following the charter school opening. These results are robust to
different border areas, and sample sizes. We also find that the effect is stronger for houses with
underperforming traditional public schools.
Our findings have several important implications. Even though our sample of Atlanta area
families might not necessarily reflect the preferences of others, the study demonstrates that
charter schools represent an important component of school choice. They not only have value to
parents, but also to property owners and policy makers by making surrounding neighborhoods
more attractive to local population.
We have concentrated on the small part of the relationship between property values and
charter schools. The political economy of charter schools has many other aspects, most of which
remain largely unstudied. For example, this paper ignores the issue of charter schools formation,
which is not random, and depends on many observable and unobservable neighborhood
characteristics. On the one hand, charter schools may be created in lower-income neighborhoods
as a way to improve residents’ access to better-quality education. On the other hand, residents in
higher-income areas might form a charter school to ensure that their children will be surrounded
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by peers from similar socio-economic background. Pursuing this line of research will shed light
on which neighborhoods benefit the most from charter schools penetration.
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Chapter III: Does More Gun Control Save Lives? Evidence from Australian National
Firearms Agreement39

1. Introduction
Public debate over stricter gun laws remains one of the most important political debates,
especially in the aftermath of mass shootings. After a mass shooting on April 28, 1996, near Port
Arthur, Tasmania that resulted in the death of 35 people the Australian government responded by
promptly securing agreement from all states40 to implement new, stricter gun ownership
regulations. The set of new firearm regulations comprised the National Firearm Agreement
(NFA).
The two most important parts of the NFA included a federal ban on the sale, transfer,
importation and ownership of certain types of long guns as well as heavier restrictions on civilian
ownership of all types of firearms. Illegal as well as legal firearms were subject to a national
buyback program, compensating owners for their surrender. According to Reuter and Mouzos
(2003), the 1997 federal buyback program resulted in the surrender of over 640,000 banned
firearms. In addition, the number of certified firearms owned by civilians decreased from
414,000 to 305,000 over 1996-97. Reuter and Mouzos point out that the 1997 buyback program
led to the removal of approximately 20 percent of the total Australian gunstock.41
In this paper, we propose two different estimation strategies to evaluate the impact of the
1996 NFA on firearm deaths in Australia at the state level. First, we employ an interrupted time
series or regression discontinuity (RD) design to evaluate the relationship between the NFA and
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This essay is based on joint work with Benjamin Ukert of Georgia State University.
Australia consists of six states (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and
Tasmania), and two territories (Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory). However, for consistency we
will use “state” to refer to both states and territories. All states have ratified the agreement within a year from its
proposal.
41
The results of 1997 buyback program would be comparable to the removal of approximately 40 million firearms
in the United States (Reuter and Mouzos 2003).
40
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changes in firearm deaths. An RD design assumes that variation in the treatment near the
threshold is in essence locally randomized due to the agents’ inability to precisely manipulate the
timing of the introduction of the law. In other words, we expect that covariates, such as income,
employment, urbanization, population, and crime are not dramatically different right before and
right after the introduction of the law in 1996. Additionally, RD requires less restrictive
assumptions relative to other non-experimental methods.
Second, we rely on a panel data approach, controlling for macro- and microeconomic factors
that could affect gun deaths and gun related activities, using a difference-in-differences (DID)
estimation strategy that gives us variation in time, and state pre-NFA firearm death rates. The
analysis exploits state variation in the pre-1996 firearm mortality comprising firearm homicides,
firearm suicides and accidental/undetermined firearm deaths. The DID assumes that the effect of
the NFA is stronger in states with higher pre-treatment firearm death rates. This identification
strategy allows us to include time fixed effects and estimate the causal effect of the NFA,
something only one prior paper addresses (Leigh and Neill 2010). Similar estimation strategies
have been applied in the health literature evaluating the effect of health insurance reform
(Courtemanche et al. 2016, Finkelstein 2007, Miller 2012). We believe that both identification
approaches will assist in shedding more light on the precise causal effect of the NFA on firearm
mortality in Australia.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the NFA affected firearm related activities even
though the effect of gun ownership on public safety remains theoretically ambiguous. On the one
hand, gun owners can protect themselves against intruders.42 Gun ownership also produces

42

According to Lott 2013, Great Britain and Canada - countries with strict gun control laws - experience much
higher incidences of burglaries where the resident is at home during the attack comparing to the United States. The
study also shows that 95% of the time individuals use guns defensively they only need to wave a gun to prevent the
attack.
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spillover effects since individuals who defend themselves are indirectly defending people around
them (Lott 2013). Assuming that criminals behave rationally, if the opportunity cost of
committing a crime increases due to a higher probability of self-defense, less crime should be
committed. On the other hand, keeping a gun at home increases the probability of accidental
injuries, homicides, and suicides (Vernick et al. 1997). The NFA reduced the stock of firearms
available to Australian population. Since the buyback program was eventually adopted by all
states, individuals could not obtain a replacement gun in a different state. Moreover, Australia
has no land borders with other countries making it more difficult for individuals to smuggle
firearms into the country. Finally, the NFA also restricted the import of firearms, which
combined with the absence of domestic gun manufacturers likely significantly limited the
amount of guns available in the country (Neill and Leigh 2010).
Similarly, the extent of the Tasmania massacre could have changed the social acceptance of
guns in Australia. For example, the atrocity of the crime and an overall shift in perception that
guns enable murdering rather than protecting people, may have had its own effect on gun related
crimes. For example, less robberies may have been committed with guns. Independent of the
immediate restriction of the law, people may have responded by securing their firearms at home
from family members and some people may have even sold their guns to buyers abroad.
The law should have also had an effect on people prone to suicide. Most gun related deaths in
Australia are suicides (Kreisfeld 2005). Thus, limiting the availability of guns can have an
immediate impact on the largest proportion of firearm victims. Taking guns out of the picture
increases the time and effort on individuals trying to commit suicide.
The evidence on the effect of the NFA are mixed. Most studies only estimate an effect
utilizing time-series variation. Three studies conclude that the NFA had a significant effect on
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firearm suicides (Ozanne-Smith et al. 2004, Chapman et al. 2006, Baker et al. 2007) and firearm
homicides (Chapman et al. 2006, Baker et al. 2015), while others find no effect on firearm
suicides and firearm homicides (Ozanne-Smith et al. 2004, Baker et al. 2007 and 2015, Klieve et
al. 2009, Lee et al. 2010). Identification with national time-series data is complicated. Any
estimation strategy relying only on time-series variation requires a strong assumption that the
trend in the outcome variable would have continued the same way had the law not been passed.
Time-specific shocks at the time of the passage of the NFA such as changes in social attitudes
towards firearms ownership could have reduced the firearm related deaths. In other words, any
time-specific shocks that potentially affected firearm deaths at the same time as the NFA will be
undistinguishable from the effects of the NFA, but will be claimed as a causal effect of the NFA.
As a result, the current time series analyses have been criticized for their short-comings (Neill et
al. 2008) because they overestimate the effect of the NFA on firearm deaths. We contribute to
this literature by presenting a more commonly applied RD model, which also takes advantage of
variation across states.
In response to the above mentioned shortcomings in the literature, Leigh and Neill (2010)
rely on a panel approach and exploit variation across states and over time that allows the
inclusion of time trends. They rely on state variation in firearm buyback rates to identify the
effect of the NFA buyback program on firearm mortality rate. They find a negative and
statistically significant effect of the NFA buyback program on homicides and suicides. While
their paper is a clear step forward, we believe that the gun buyback rates are correlated with state
specific unobservable characteristics that may overestimate the effect of the NFA. We provide a
more detailed critique of Neill and Leigh’ identification strategy in the literature review. In
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contrast, we rely on cross-sectional variation in pre-NFA firearm mortality rates and a more
extensive set of control variables to identify the effect of the NFA on firearm related activities.
We find negative, but not consistently significant effect of the NFA on firearm mortality in
our RD models. However, the NFA appeared to increase non-firearm and non-weapon robberies
in New South Wales suggesting that criminals were substituting guns with other means.43 In our
full sample DID regressions we show that the NFA decreased the total firearm death rate by
2.183 per 100,000, for a state with the average 1994-96 pre-treatment mean total firearm deaths
rate. The reduction also translates into a 60% decrease in total firearm death rate from pre-NFA
levels. The decrease in the total firearm death rate emerges from a 0.746 per 100,000 reduction
in the firearm homicide rate and a 1.281 per 100,000 reduction in the firearm suicide rate. The
results are robust to model specification as well as placebo tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background on
the NFA. Section 3 summarizes existing literature. Section 4 describes data. Section 5 lays out
the empirical approach. Section 6 presents results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Background on the National Firearm Agreement
The introduction of the National Firearms Agreement (NFA) followed an episode of mass
shooting that took place on April 28, 1996, near Port Arthur, Tasmania, when a gunman armed
with a semiautomatic rifle killed thirty-five people and injured eighteen others. With support of
Prime Minister John Howard, The Australasian Police Ministers’ Council (APMC) called a
special session on May 10, 1996, to discuss a national plan for uniform firearms regulations
across the country. The law was ratified by all states by May 1997. The two most important
aspects of the new legislation included the federal ban on the sale, transfer, importation and
ownership of all semi-automatic self-loading and pump action long arms as well as tighter gun
43

This result was obtained using monthly robbery data, which we only have for New South Wales.
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regulations for civilians and heavier restrictions on ownership of non-banned firearms. The
buyback program that was designed to compensate the owners of the newly made illegal firearms
accompanied the federal ban on ownership of certain firearms. Buyback prices were set at the
level of retail prices, and did not vary across states. Civilians had an opportunity to sell their
legal firearms in addition to the banned ones. Official statistics show that Australians chose to
surrender over 640,000 banned firearms as well as 60,000 non-banned firearms nationwide
between 1996 and 1997 (Reuter and Mouzos 2003). According to Reuter and Mouzos, the
buyback program facilitated the removal of approximately 20 percent of the total amount of
firearms in Australia.
The most important restrictions on firearm ownership included a separate permit for each
firearm acquisition with a mandatory 28-day waiting period; establishment of the universal
firearms registration system; prohibition of firearms’ sales by anyone other than authorized
dealers; presence of a “genuine” reason for gun ownership, which specifically excluded personal
protection; minimum age requirements (18); firearm safety training; presence of identification
documents at the time of firearm purchase; storage safety standards; and absence of recent
criminal convictions. Leigh and Neill (2010) present a more detailed overview of the NFA’s
components.
The NFA became the first Australian nationwide set of laws restricting or prohibiting
ownership of firearms by civilian population. However, prior- and post-NFA, some individual
states designed and implemented their own sale, ownership and storage firearm regulations. The
most relevant state legislations include Victoria - Control of Weapons Act of 1990 and Firearms
Regulation of 2008, New South Wales - Firearms Regulation of 2006, Queensland -Weapons Act
of 1990, Western Australia - Firearms Act of 1973 and Firearms Regulations of 1974, and South
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Australia - Firearms Act of 1977.44 We believe that the timing of state law changes are not close
enough to the passage of the NFA and therefore allow us to clearly identify the impact of the NFA
on firearm related deaths45.
3. Literature Review
There have been a large amount of studies evaluating the impact of tighter gun regulations or
related gun policies on firearm deaths. Much literature concentrated on evaluating the
relationship between gun ownership and criminal activity in the United States (Duggan 2000,
Vernick et al. 1997, Lott 2013, Cook 1982, Kleck and Patterson 1993). Some studies found
evidence that gun ownership positively affects the amount of criminal activity, while others
found negative effects. Lott (2013) provides an overview of the main methodological issues that
arise in both time-series and cross-sectional studies. Cross-sectional analysis may be biased due
to the fact that regions with higher crime rates often adopt stricter gun laws. The reverse
causality issue leads to positive estimates of the effect of stricter gun laws on crime rates. Timeseries studies fail to separate the impact of stricter gun laws from other potential causes that
induce fluctuations in crime rates. Lastly, Lott mentions behavioral concerns: some people might
be more likely to own guns, than others. Probability of gun ownership might be determined by
the same factors that determine the likelihood of any particular person being killed with a
firearm, which introduces endogeneity issues into the analysis. A solution to the behavioral
problem would require a randomized study.
A number of previous studies have also debated the success of the 1996 National Firearm
Agreement in reducing crimes related to firearm activity. Most of them perform time-series
analysis using publicly available data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Lee
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Source: Library of Congress.
Controlling for state laws does not change our regression results in DID model.
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and Suardi (2010) find little evidence of a significant negative relationship between NFA and
firearm deaths using a time series approach based on unknown structural breaks. Klieve et al.
(2009) assessed pre- and post-1996 trends in firearm suicides separately for Queensland and
Australia using a negative binomial regression analysis. They found no significant relationship
between the NFA and male firearm suicides for Queensland, but a negative and significant
relationship for Australia. The authors speculated that gradual changes in social behavior as well
as cultural norms contributed more towards the observed reduction in male firearm suicides, than
the NFA.
Other studies demonstrate the success of the NFA in reducing firearm deaths. Chapman et al.
(2006) argue that not only the introduction of the NFA led to the reduction in firearm deaths
since 1996, particularly suicides, but also prevented reoccurrence of mass shootings in Australia
over the next decades. Given the fact that the NFA was designed to prevent mass shootings
rather than just decrease firearm death rates, Chapman et al. argue that the legislation was
successful. Baker and McPhedran (2007) use Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA) to show that NFA implementation contributed to a significant decline in suicides as
well as accidental firearm deaths, but that it had an insignificant impact on other firearm deaths.
They also find no evidence of potential substitution from firearm homicide towards other
weapons. Baker and McPhedran join existing studies in suggesting that other social factors like
improved income stability might have contributed to an observed decline in firearm deaths in
Australia over the past two decades46.
Reuter and Mouzos (2003) document a sharp fall in firearm homicides between 1996 and
1999. However, they find evidence of substitution from longarm guns towards handguns that
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See also Duggan 2003, Beautrais et al. 2006, Kates 1990, and Kellerman et al. 1993.
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remained legal after the NFA47. Contrary to other studies, Reuter and Mouzos find no significant
effect of the NFA on the long-term downward trend in firearm suicides or accidental firearm
injuries.
All the studies described above involve mostly time-series analysis for separate states or for
Australia as whole. However, there are a few studies that attempt to perform analysis using
variations in time of adoption of stricter gun regulations, or variations in numbers of firearms
withdrawn due to the NFA buyback program. Ozanne-Smith et al. (2004) examine the effect of
various gun control laws on firearm deaths using time variation in the introduction of those laws
in Victoria and the rest of Australia. They find that the tightening of gun laws in Victoria that
took place in 1988 led to a more rapid decline in Victoria’s firearm deaths relative to the rest of
the country prior to 1996. Ozanne-Smith et al. demonstrate that the rest of the country was able
to “catch up” with Victoria’s reduction in firearm deaths after the 1996 NFA legislation. Also a
more recent study by Leigh and Neill (2010) evaluates the relationship between the NFA and
firearm deaths using variation in the number of firearms withdrawn by the Australian
government across states. They argue that states with more firearms bought back should have
experienced a larger decline in firearm deaths relative to states with fewer firearms bought back.
Leigh and Neill find that the NFA firearm buyback led to an 80 percent reduction in firearm
suicides as well as significant but less precise reduction in firearm homicides at the mean
baseline gun buyback level. They also demonstrate that states with larger amounts of firearms
bought back experienced larger declines in all firearm deaths.
This study employs a difference-in-differences strategy that relies on state variation in preNFA firearm mortality rates. We believe that our strategy represents an improvement over Leigh
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Between 1992-1993 and 2000-2001, the proportion of homicides committed with a handgun rose from less than
one-sixth of the total number of firearm homicides to almost 50 percent (Mouzos 2002a).
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and Neill (2010) for a number of reasons. First, Leigh and Neill (2010) assume that variation in
states gun buybacks is exogenous.48 However, there are many potentially unobservable
confounders that can drive variation in buyback rates. For example, states with less crime-prone
people may see larger buyback rates. Second, Leigh and Neill’s identification strategy assumes
that the effect of the NFA is proportional to the gun buyback rates and is absent for a state with
zero gun buybacks. However, the NFA had other regulations besides buybacks, which included
strict ownership restrictions, this assumption less plausible.
In contrast, we rely on state variation in firearm death rates pre-NFA. We believe that this is
a weaker assumption, since the effect of the NFA should be proportional to previous firearm use.
Therefore, states with zero pre-treatment firearm death rates should see no effect on firearm
death rates post NFA. Our specification measures the effect of the NFA through both its sale
ownership regulations and the gun buyback program. Specifically, states with higher firearm
deaths implicitly have more guns or more crime. We also include an extensive set of socioeconomic characteristics to control for observable time-variant differences across Australian
states.
4. Data
We obtain annual data for the national level and the eight states from the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) and firearm states data from the dataset used by Leigh and Neil (2010), which
is available online. At the state level we investigate how the regulation affected firearm suicide
rate, firearm homicide rate, accidental and undetermined firearm death rate, and total firearm
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Leigh and Neill (2010) discuss and test for the possibility of endogenous gun buyback rates with an instrumental
variable approach which by itself requires strong assumptions (Angrist and Imbens 1995).
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death rate per year from 1968 to 2002.4950 In all cases we standardize the dependent variable by
population count and generate rates per 100,000 residents. In our panel data analysis we combine
our dependent variables with information on the national unemployment rate, urbanization level,
the proportion of people between the ages of 20 and 25, in five year increments up to the
proportion of people above 65, and average annual earnings per person. We also control for
existing state gun regulations as a robustness check. However, we do not have full information
on all control variables dating back to 1968. Thus, our preferred specifications only include the
time frame for 1971-2002.51
Our DID approach identifies the effect of the NFA using variation in three year (1994-1996)
mean pre-treatment total firearm death rates across states. Since the total level of firearm deaths
is relatively low, even small changes in gun violence can lead to a significant spike in the firearm
death rate in a state with low level of population (i.e. Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory, and
Northern Territory). Thus this measure should reflect the overall trend and level of firearm
deaths in each state. We also construct a two-year average (1995-1996) and test if our results are
significantly different.
Lastly, for our RD design, we utilize the aforementioned annual data and monthly
information on firearm, non-firearm, and non-weapon robberies from January 1995 to December
1997 for New South Wales from the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on firearm suicides, firearm homicides, and total
firearm deaths by month.
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In addition, we have state information on firearm, non-firearm and non-weapon robberies for 1993-1997, which is
a significantly shorter panel.
50
McPhedran et al. (2012) report that the ABS systematically undercounted firearm homicides and suicide since
2003 (Bradley et al. 2011, De Leo 2007, Elnour et al. 2009).
51
We only have unemployment information for some states beginning in 1975. This reduces our observations to 243
with all control variables.
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Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for the means and standard deviations for the
dependent and control variables by state. The average total firearm death, firearm suicide and
firearm homicide death rates per 100, 000 residents vary across state from 2.5-8.3, 1.8-5.0, and
0.3-1.7, respectively. The 1994-1996 pre-treatment average firearm death, firearm suicide and
firearm homicide death rates per 100, 000 residents are 3.62, 2.56, 0.78 respectively. We use
these values to estimate the effect of the NFA at the mean level.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES

N

Firearm Death Rate

35

Firearm Suicide Rate

35

Firearm Homicide Rate

35

Firearm Accident Rate
Non-Firearm Death
Rate
Non-Firearm Suicide
Rate
Non-Firearm Homicide
Rate
Non-Firearm Accident
Rate

35
35
35
35
35

Australian
Capital
Territory
2.450
(1.644)
1.882
(1.228)
0.253
(0.461)
0.315
(0.478)
35.830
(7.725)
8.211
(2.579)
0.806
(0.643)
26.81
(8.439)

New
South
Wales
3.253
(0.964)
2.359
(0.676)
0.551
(0.172)
0.343
(0.251)
48.315
(10.271)
9.604
(1.554)
1.252
(0.260)
37.46
(11.00)

6.181
(1.073)
475.6
(188.5)
11.17
(0.909)
9.201
(0.948)
8.678
(0.805)
7.874

6.143
(2.717)
381.4
(206.4)
9.511
(0.743)
7.949
(0.343)
7.572
(0.601)
7.058

Northern
Territory Queensland
8.264
4.975
(3.345)
(1.469)
4.995
3.986
(2.370)
(1.217)
1.679
0.568
(1.373)
(0.282)
1.590
0.421
(1.369)
(0.223)
97.108
53.398
(25.310)
(11.298)
8.156
10.01
(5.978)
(2.034)
10.16
1.463
(4.018)
(0.327)
78.79
41.93
(26.28)
(12.16)

South
Australia
3.588
(1.175)
2.881
(0.951)
0.483
(0.263)
0.225
(0.184)
45.692
(7.114)
9.509
(2.021)
1.079
(0.362)
35.10
(8.591)

Tasmania
6.464
(2.131)
4.903
(1.933)
0.837
(1.243)
0.723
(0.413)
51.640
(11.066)
8.643
(2.130)
0.891
(0.512)
42.11
(11.80)

Victoria
3.117
(1.058)
2.327
(0.781)
0.490
(0.233)
0.301
(0.187)
45.338
(10.023)
9.008
(1.664)
0.988
(0.247)
35.34
(10.78)

Western
Australia
2.512
(0.729)
1.976
(0.542)
0.271
(0.153)
0.265
(0.213)
48.485
(9.817)
10.13
(1.863)
1.379
(0.390)
36.97
(10.83)

7.097
(2.811)
344.0
(184.1)
9.488
(0.923)
7.744
(0.556)
7.368
(0.737)
6.902

7.380
(3.266)
339.6
(173.3)
9.182
(1.031)
7.470
(0.649)
7.210
(0.720)
6.814

6.000
(2.818)
369.2
(194.9)
9.723
(0.685)
7.990
(0.349)
7.571
(0.654)
7.016

6.117
(2.673)
358.7
(187.9)
9.951
(0.816)
8.241
(0.515)
7.823
(0.683)
7.274

Control Variables
Unemployment Rate

27

Earnings per Week

30

Percent Age 20 to 25

32

Percent Age 26-30

32

Percent Age 31-35
Percent Age 36-40

32
32

6.442
(1.416)
444.9
(163.3)
12.27
(1.213)
10.88
(0.775)
9.492
(0.571)
7.912

6.874
(2.756)
346.7
(182.1)
9.742
(0.663)
7.832
(0.381)
7.386
(0.685)
6.930
72

Percent Age 41-45

32

Percent Age 46-50

32

Percent Age 51-55

32

Percent Age 56-60

32

Percent Age 61-65

32

Percent Age 65+

32

Percent Male

32

Urban Growth Rate

35

(0.971)
6.865
(1.138)
5.857
(1.162)
4.632
(0.996)
3.397
(0.582)
2.520
(0.521)
4.916
(1.829)
50.09
(0.525)
0.0007
(0.003)

(0.825)
6.448
(0.786)
5.914
(0.661)
5.335
(0.506)
4.743
(0.258)
4.229
(0.209)
10.18
(1.501)
49.83
(0.169)
0.0008
(0.005)

(1.002)
6.292
(1.166)
4.967
(1.115)
3.681
(0.893)
2.527
(0.499)
1.645
(0.280)
2.298
(0.555)
53.35
(1.071)
0.005
(0.03)

(0.938)
6.331
(0.970)
5.736
(0.838)
5.105
(0.641)
4.478
(0.294)
3.968
(0.171)
9.482
(0.964)
50.18
(0.174)
0.0002
(0.008)

(0.950)
6.372
(0.926)
5.906
(0.799)
5.389
(0.624)
4.830
(0.317)
4.360
(0.288)
10.91
(2.041)
49.63
(0.142)
0.002
(0.004)

(0.946)
6.251
(0.981)
5.710
(0.835)
5.181
(0.638)
4.650
(0.294)
4.177
(0.202)
10.17
(1.784)
49.68
(0.292)
0.001
(0.001)

Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses, N represents the maximum number of observations for a state.
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(0.860)
6.398
(0.826)
5.854
(0.679)
5.243
(0.511)
4.617
(0.242)
4.094
(0.194)
10.05
(1.457)
49.61
(0.218)
0.001
(0.003)

(0.929)
6.547
(0.982)
5.764
(0.858)
4.922
(0.646)
4.177
(0.269)
3.625
(0.161)
8.559
(1.096)
50.51
(0.318)
0.003
(0.005)

Lastly, Figure 6 presents the national trend in firearm deaths across time. We see that after
1997 the trend decreases more sharply, providing some preliminary evidence that the NFA may
have in fact affected the firearm death rate.
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Figure 6: Trends in the firearm death rate pre and post NFA
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5. Identification Strategy
We apply two identification strategies to evaluate the relationship between the NFA and
firearm death rate. First, we apply an interrupted time series (ITS) or sharp Regression
Discontinuity design that is similar to the approach taken in the literature (Lee and Suardi 2010).
A sharp RD design relies on several identification assumptions (Hahn, Todd, and van der
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Klauuw 2001). Most notably, it relies on the assumption that the mortality trend without the law
would have been continuous before and after 1997. In other words, observable characteristics
right before the law and right after the law should be similar and the timing of the law is as good
as random. Therefore, if the law would have been passed in 1995 we should have seen a similar
effect of the NFA on mortality and gun related activities. Our RD design at the state level can be
represented in a reduced form model:
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑖 , 𝑡) + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

(3)

Where Mortality represents the mortality rate from firearm related death, which includes
suicide, homicide, and accidental death in state i and year t; 𝑡𝑖 represents time, measured in years
from the passage of the NFA; 𝑓(∙)is a function that is continuous in 1997 with parameter vector 𝑡
– flexible polynomial; and Postlaw is an indicator for whether the time is after the NFA (Card et
al. 2009). We can interpret out coefficient of interest 𝛽1 as an estimate of the effect of the NFA
on firearm mortality rate. The law indicator variable equals 1 once the law passed. For our
annual data analysis this would mean that the law switches to 1 in 1997. We interpret the beta
coefficient as the causal effect of the law on the firearm mortality rate.
There are some legitimate concerns with the RD approach. It is unlikely that the trends across
time are continuous especially for an outcome variable such as firearm deaths. Accordingly, the
RD effect emerges as an immediate jump after the cutoff, in this case the month after the passage
of the law, which seems unlikely to occur since it took longer to fully implement all aspects of
the NFA. We expect that important components of the law would only affect mortality over time.
For example, the gun buyback program requires participant’s knowledge of refunds if they hand
in their gun and it is unlikely that most residents responded quickly. There could also be an
anticipation effect of the law violating the RD assumption, where individuals change behavior in
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response to the announcement of a law prior to its actual implementation. Anticipation effects
would lead to a shift in trend or discontinuity to the announcement of a change rather than when
the change goes into law. Normally, RD requires that there would have been no fluctuations of
firearm deaths from 1996 to 1997 that are unrelated to the law. We believe that it is quite
possible to have fluctuations across years. They can be seen in Figure 6 for several time periods.
As a result, we also rely on a panel specification that allows for fluctuations across time in
our outcome variable while controlling for several other factors that may influence firearm
deaths. We estimate:

Mortality it   0  1 * Postlawt   2 * yearit  X it   it   it

(4)

Where 𝛽1 is the same as defined in Equation (3), yeart is a binary indicator for each year
(time fixed effect),  it is state fixed effect, and X t is a vector of control variables. We also
estimate Equation (4) in separate regressions with a 2nd and 3rd polynomial time trends.
Our preferred methodology takes advantage of variation across states to identify the effect of
the NFA on the firearm mortality rate. We utilize variation across states in pre-treatment firearm
death rate in 1994-1996.52 Our specification suggests that those states with a higher level of
firearm death rate in 1994-1996 should be affected by the law to a larger extent than those states
with lower levels of firearm death rate in 1994-1996. In other words, we believe that the effect of
the law corresponds to the prior mortality level, because it reflects the underlying heterogeneity
in firearm related crimes by state. Taking advantage of this variation allows us to add time fixed
effects to capture changes in the outcome that would have occurred had the law not been passed.

52

Each state had to ratify the NFA to make it a law. As a result, in most states buyback program as well as sale and
ownership restrictions on firearms did not take effect until late 1996-early 1997. Therefore, even though the NFA
regulations were proposed in mid-1996, we treat 1997 as the first year in our post-NFA time period.
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This specification is equal to a difference-in-differences (DID) model:

Mortality it   0  1 * Mortality i * Postlawt   i  t  X it   it

(5)

Where Mortality i is the mean 1994-1996 firearm death rate in state i, and t is a year fixed
effect. In Equation (5), the effect of the law is given by 1 * Mortality i * Postlawt and is
proportionate to the pre-law mortality level increasing linearly with the mortality rate. We
believe that this is a plausible identification because it assumes that the law has no effect at a
mortality level of 0, while allowing for a time fixed effect.
6. Results
6.1 Regression Discontinuity
Tables 13-17 present the regression results for the RD estimation strategy on the effect of the
NFA on total firearm death rate, firearm suicide rate, firearm homicide rate, and accidental and
undetermined firearm death rate, respectively. In each table columns 1-3 show the results
utilizing state variation in three regressions where the first includes only a dummy variable for
the law, the second includes a quadratic time trend, and the third includes a quadratic and a cubic
time trends. All specifications include state fixed effects.
The coefficient in the first column of Table 13 suggests that the law decreased the total
firearm death rate by 2 per 100,000 residents. However, the result is not robust to adding time
trends.
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Table 13: The effect of the NFA on the firearm death rate (RD)
(1)

Law
Quadratic Time Trend
Cubic Time Trend
State Fixed Effect
Sample Size
R-squared

(2)
(3)
Total Firearm Death Rate (State)
-2.069***
-0.548
-0.714
(0.569)
(0.572)
(0.440)
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
280
280
280
0.709
0.732
0.733

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Tables 14 and 15 indicate that the NFA caused a decline in firearm suicide rate and firearm
homicide rate, though the effect is not robust to the addition of the flexible time trend. Only in
Table 16 illustrating the effect of the NFA on the accidental and undetermined intent firearm
death rate the coefficient switches sign. Overall, our findings using RD design do not show
evidence of consistent relationship between the NFA and firearm mortality rates.

Table 14: The effect of the NFA on the firearm suicide rate (RD)
(1)
Law
Quadratic Time Trend
Cubic Time Trend
State Fixed Effect
Sample Size
R-squared

-1.776***
(0.422)
NO
NO
YES
280
0.610

(2)
Firearm Suicide Rate (State)
-0.462
(0.269)
YES
NO
YES
280
0.648

(3)
-0.506*
(0.235)
YES
YES
YES
280
0.648

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15: The effect of the NFA on the firearm homicide rate (RD)

Law
Quadratic Time Trend
Cubic Time Trend
State Fixed Effects
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)

(2)
Firearm Homicide Rate (State)

(3)

-0.393*
(0.186)
NO
NO
YES
280
0.318

-0.328
(0.328)
YES
NO
YES
280
0.318

-0.320
(0.407)
YES
YES
YES
280
0.318

Notes: Heteroscedasticity Robust Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.

Table 16: The effect of the NFA on the accidental and undetermined intent firearm death rate
(RD)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Firearm Accidental and Undetermined Intent Death Rate (State)
Law
Quadratic Time Trend
Cubic Time Trend
State Fixed Effects
Sample Size
R-squared

0.100**
(0.034)
NO
NO
YES
280
0.447

0.243
(0.128)
YES
NO
YES
280
0.450

0.112
(0.073)
YES
YES
YES
280
0.453

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

We also present results for the RD design using monthly firearm robbery information from
New South Wales for the time frame from January 1995 to December 1997. This specification
may be more plausible than using annual data as it would capture the immediate discontinuity in
the month following the passage of the law by New South Wales government. However, we
cannot make an apples-to-apples comparison because the dependent variable is different. Table
17 shows the same three time trend specifications as in the previous tables. Columns 1-3 present
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the effect of the NFA on the non-weapon robbery rate and columns 4-6 present results for the
non-firearm robbery rate. We find that both non-firearm and non-weapon robberies increased.
The results suggest that criminals may have substituted guns for other tools or stopped using
weapons during robberies. Specifically, after the passage of the NFA in New South Wales in
December of 1996, non-weapon robberies increased by 1.3 from a baseline mean non-weapon
robbery rate of 6.41 in 1995-1996 or over 20%, and non-firearm robberies increased by almost 1
from the baseline mean non-weapon robbery rate of 2.86 in 1995-1996 or by about 35%.

Table 17: The effect of the NFA on firearm robberies in New South Wales (RD)

Law
Quadratic
Time Trend
Cubic Time
Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)
(2)
(3)
Robbery Rate w/o Weapon
1.324***
1.546**
1.321**
(0.484)
(0.579)
(0.641)

(4)

(5)
(6)
Non-firearm Robbery Rate
1.126***
0.688*
0.993**
(0.313)
(0.348)
(0.367)

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO
36
0.643

NO
36
0.648

YES
36
0.656

NO
36
0.873

NO
36
0.892

YES
36
0.904

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In summary, RD results show that the effect of the NFA on firearm mortality rate is negative,
but not robust to the addition of flexible time trend. We also find evidence that non-firearm and
non-weapon robberies increased in New South Wales after the passage of the NFA. Our results
are in line with the previous literature that finds no significant effect of the NFA with similar
identification strategy (Ozanne-Smith et al. 2004). Given the assumptions of the RD design, we
believe that identifying a robust effect across time is implausible for two reasons. The use of
annual data is inappropriate and the legislation should not have necessarily led to an immediate
discontinuous drop in firearm related death rates. Instead we believe that the law’s components
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can be captured across time with a fully specified model that includes time and year fixed
effects. The next section presents our results for those regressions.
6.2 Difference-in-Differences
Panel results of Equation (4) which estimates the effect of the NFA with a dummy variable
on the total firearm death rate can be found in Table 25, Appendix 3. We believe that this
estimation strategy is a naïve approach. The inconceivable magnitude of the estimated results,
we find point estimates ranging from -8.377 to -12.69, suggest that it is likely that the
coefficients capture a significantly large time fixed effect. Therefore, we focus our discussion on
the preferred panel DID model of Equation (5) in Table 18.

Table 18: The effect of the NFA on the total firearm death rate (DID)
(1)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.587*** -0.567*** -0.579*** -0.602***
(0.053)
(0.071)
(0.097)
(0.160)

-0.459***
(0.106)

-2.127*** -2.054*** -2.098*** -2.183***
(0.192)
(0.259)
(0.353)
(0.580)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
243
243
243
0.801
0.812
0.819
0.830

-1.665***
(0.384)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.796

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In each column we present the point estimate and the computed implied effect of the NFA on
the firearm death rate at the mean-pre-treatment 1994-1996 firearm death rate. Thus, the implied
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effect of the NFA equals 1 * Mortality i , where Mortality i = 3.62 firearm deaths per 100,000
residents. Each column also presents a different set of control variables. Column 1 includes
economic and regional controls and state and time fixed effects. Columns 2-5 increase the
amount of control variables in the model: column 2 adds the percent of male population in each
state, column 3 adds the percent of young (19<age<26) and old (age>65) residents in each state,
column 4 adds a full specification for each age group in five year intervals, and column 5 adds a
2nd order polynomial time-trend.
Our preferred specification includes all controls (column 4) and shows that the NFA reduced
the firearm death rate by 2.183 in a state with the mean pre-treatment firearm death rate.53 Across
specification our results are robust and statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words,
the NFA reduced firearm death rate by 60% from mean 1994-1996 pre-NFA levels of 3.62.
Queensland has the closest pre-treatment mean of 4.14, which would imply that Queensland
should see a reduction in the firearm death rate of 2.49 units to a post-treatment level of 1.65.
The average three year post-treatment total firearm death rate from 1997-1999 equals 2.55 in
Queensland suggesting that Queensland saw an actual reduction of 1.59 in the firearm death rate
relative to the predicted 2.49 drop. This indicates that our model over predicts. However,
depending on the model specification in Table 18, the NFA reduces the firearm death rate from
roughly 1.7 to 2.2 for a state with the average pre-treatment total firearm death rate. Thus, our
lower bound effect is not far from Queensland’s actual drop.
Given the large heterogeneity in the pre-treatment firearm death rates by state (ranging from
1.31 to 7.13 firearm deaths per 100,000), the effect of the NFA for the state with the lowest and

53

As a robustness check, we also control for any existing state gun regulations, but the coefficients remain similar to
the ones in Column 4 of Tables 18-21.
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the highest pre-treatment firearm death rate equals 0.79 and 4.29, respectively. This suggests that
the NFA reduced the firearm death rate in a state with the lowest pre-treatment firearm death rate
by 0.79 deaths per 100,000 residents, and reduced the firearm death rate in the state with the
highest pre-treatment firearm death rate by 4.29 deaths per 100,000 residents. Overall, the results
indicate that the NFA was effective in reducing firearm deaths in Australia. We also replace our
variable of interest, the three year average pre-treatment firearm death rate, with a two year
average, 1995-96, firearm death rate and a one year average, 1996, firearm death rate, and find
similar results.
We also investigate how the NFA affected firearm suicides, homicides and accidents. Tables
19 through 21 present results for the firearm suicide rate, firearm homicide rate, and accidental
and undetermined firearm death rate, respectively. In Table 19 our preferred specification shows
that the NFA decreased the firearm suicide rate by 1.281 deaths per 100,000 residents. This
results is statistically significant at the 5% level. Across model specifications we find similar
effects ranging from 1 to 1.3 deaths per 100,000 residents. Relative to the three year pretreatment baseline firearm suicide rate of 2.56, the results suggest that the NFA lowered the
firearm suicide death rate by 50%. Again, given the large heterogeneity in the pre-treatment
firearm death rates by state, the effect of the NFA can reduce firearm suicide rates by as low as
0.46 and as high as 2.52 deaths per 100,000 residents.
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Table 19: The effect of the NFA on the firearm suicide rate (DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.322***
(0.085)

-0.322**
(0.096)

-0.346*** -0.353**
(0.094)
(0.135)

-0.274**
(0.090)

-1.168 ***
(0.307)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.744

-1.166**
(0.347)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.758

-1.253*** -1.281**
(0.339)
(0.489)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
243
243
0.762
0.773

-0.992**
(0.328)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.727

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Similarly, our results on the effects of the NFA on the firearm homicide rates in Table 20
suggest that the NFA reduced the firearm homicide rate by 0.746 in a state with the mean pretreatment firearm death rate. Given a three-year mean firearm homicide rate of 0.78, the NFA
appeared to reduce the firearm homicides rate by 96% for a state with the mean pre-treatment
firearm death rate. The NFA reduced firearm homicide rates by as low as 0.27 and as high as
1.47 deaths per 100,000 residents depending on the state mean pre-treatment death rates. Finally,
we find no significant effect of the NFA on accidental and undetermined firearm death rate in
Table 21.
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Table 20: The effect of the NFA on the firearm homicide rate (DID)
(1)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.222*** -0.218*** -0.210***
(0.043)
(0.037)
(0.025)

-0.206**
(0.069)

-0.191*
(0.084)

-0.804*** -0.790*** -0.762***
(0.155)
(0.135)
(0.091)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
243
243
0.422
0.424
0.439

-0.746**
(0.250)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.468

-0.691*
(0.305)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.398

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 21: The effect of the NFA on the accidental and undetermined intent firearm death rate
(DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.043
(0.033)

-0.027
(0.024)

-0.023
(0.021)

-0.043
(0.049)

0.005
(0.041)

-0.154
(0.119)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.504

-0.098
(0.089)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.530

-0.083
(0.076)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.536

-0.156
(0.179)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.558

0.018
(0.148)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.469

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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We also test whether the non-firearm death rate changes after the NFA. For example, it is
possible that the limited access to guns after the NFA led to more homicides and suicides
committed by other means. In other words we might expect a substitution effect. Tables 26-29 in
Appendix 3 present the results for total non-firearm death rate, non-firearm suicide rate, nonfirearm homicide rate and non-firearm accidental and undetermined death rate. We find some
evidence that non-firearm accidental and undetermined intent decreased after the NFA. Our
preferred specification is not statistically significant, but other specifications with less control
variables show a significant effect with relatively similar point estimates. This is a surprising and
interesting finding. We are unsure what explains this effect. We speculate that coroners may
have classified some cases that are firearm related as non-firearm related.
Overall, we find that the NFA decreased firearm death rates, with a larger proportion of the
total decrease coming from firearm suicides than firearm homicides.54 The results are not
surprising. About 71% of all firearm deaths in Australia are suicides55 and therefore we would
expect to find that the NFA had a proportionally larger effect on firearm suicides than firearm
homicides. We also find that the NFA decreased the firearm homicide rate dramatically by about
96% for a state with the mean pre-treatment total firearm death rates. However, we cannot
disentangle how the NFA’s gun buyback program and the gun possession regulations separately
affected the reduction in firearm suicides and firearm homicides. We speculate that the gun
buyback program affected firearm deaths over-time by reducing the overall number of guns in
the country and increased the price of guns on the black market, thus possibly reducing the

54

We also redo all estimations with the change in total firearm death rate, change in firearm suicide rate, change in
firearm homicide rate, and change in accidental and undetermined firearm death rate as dependent variables to make
sure we don’t just pick up existing long-term downward trends in firearm mortality. The coefficients remain
negative and significant. However, their magnitudes increase. This suggests that our main results might represent
conservative estimates of the effect of the NFA on firearm mortality.
55
Based on the three year pre-treatment means.
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amount of firearm homicides as other means of weapons were relied on for criminal activity. At
the same time, gun regulations such as the 28-day waiting period for the purchase of new guns,
may have had an immediate effect on people trying to commit a suicide on impulse.
6.3 Robustness
The identification of the DID relies on the assumption that had the NFA not taken place
changes in firearm death rates would not have been correlated with pre-treatment firearm death
rates. We test if our specification is robust by running regressions where we change the date of
the NFA implementation to an earlier year. Specifically, we run “placebo” treatments in the pretreatment periods 1990-1995, giving us 6 estimates from our regression including all control
variables. Finding significance in any of those regressions suggests that the changes in firearm
deaths may have occurred even without the NFA. Table 22 presents the placebo results for the
total firearm death rate. Each column presents estimates for a regression changing the NFA
enactment to a different year beginning with 1990. All regressions from 1990-1995 indicate no
significant effect of the NFA on total firearm death rate. These results support a conclusions that
our main results have a causal interpretation. 56

56

Postdating the treatment to any year from 1999 to 2002 shows significant effects. The gun buyback program was
not limited to 1997, instead there were periodically gun buyback programs up until 2001 (Reuter and Mouzos 2003).
Thus, the differential level of gun buyback purchases, implemented by different states can be correlated with the
pre-treatment firearm death rate. As a result, those estimates may in fact display the continuous impact of the NFA
in later years and presents evidence that the gun buyback program was indeed an effective tool in reducing firearm
deaths rather than serving as a true placebo test.

87

Table 22: Placebo treatment tests
Placebo Treatment year

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Sample Size
R-squared

-0.0627
(0.243)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.813

-0.295
(0.249)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.820

-0.230
(0.262)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.817

-0.336
(0.266)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.820

-0.299
(0.266)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.818

-0.309
(0.252)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.818

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Similarly to Leigh and Neill (2010) we drop 1996 due to its outlier observations of the
increased homicide rate in Tasmania and the potential reduced firearm related activity due to the
mourning of the nation. Dropping 1996 does not change our main results. We also allow for the
possibility that the data collection in earlier years was less accurate and limit the sample to 19792002. Across all specifications we find similar results as reported in Table 18.
7. Conclusion
Our paper revisits the literature estimating the impact of the NFA on firearm-related activity.
First, we use an RD design and find negative, but not robust effect of the NFA on firearm
mortality rates. However, we find that non-firearm and non-weapon robberies in New South
Wales have increased following the passage of the NFA possibly suggesting substitution away
from gun use. Second, we apply a DID method that relies on state variation in the pre-treatment
firearm death rates. Our main results show that the NFA reduced the total firearm death rate by
60% for a state with the mean pre-treatment total firearm death rate. The results are robust to
model specification and placebo tests.
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Our DID approach and findings extend the current literature. First, we provide evidence that
RD may not reveal treatment effects in cases when only annual data is available. Additionally,
the NFA had several components with many of those components requiring time to implement
and enforce, which limits the researcher’s ability to pinpoint an exact treatment timeframe.
Second, we rely on cross-sectional variation that allows us to identify the impact of the NFA
given the plausible assumption that it had no effect in states with a zero pre-NFA firearm death
rate. This approach also allows us to include time and state fixed effects, something that is not
common in studies measuring the effect of national policies over time. We also believe that our
DID approach requires weaker assumptions than Leigh and Neill (2010), but presents stronger
and more robust results.
Our results indicate that comprehensive firearm regulations indeed contribute to a decline in
firearm mortality. However, due to its relative geographic isolation, Australia might have more
favorable conditions for controlling its firearm supply and availability than other countries that
share land borders with each other. As a result, we cannot claim that out results have external
validity, and would be applicable if other nations pass comprehensive firearm regulations.
Future research on federal firearm regulations should concentrate on disentangling various
components of those regulations to identify which regulation most significantly affects firearm
mortality (i.e. buyback program, waiting period, registration, mandatory training, etc.) This will
allow policy makers to focus their attention on specific ways to combat negative aspects of
civilian gun ownership.
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Appendix 1
Figure 7: Federal subjects by groups

Group 1
Altai, Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Chuvashia, Ingushetia, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Jewish
Autonomous Region, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kaliningrad, Kalmykia, Kaluga, Karelia, Kemerovo,
Khakassia, Kirov, Komi, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Murmansk, Nenets Autonomous Region,
North Ossetia – Alania, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orel, Penza, Primorye, Ryazan, Sakhalin,
Samara, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Taymyr Autonomous Region, Tomsk, Tuva, Tver, Yakutia
Group 2:
Adygea, Astrakhan, Bashkortostan, Belgorod, Evenk Autonomous Region, Khabarovsk, Khanty-Mansi
Autonomous Region, Koryak Autonomous Region, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Magadan, Mordovia,
Moscow, Moscow City, Nizhegorodsk, Pskov, Rostov, Smolensk, Tambov, Tatarstan, Tyumen,
Udmurtia, Ulyanovsk, Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Region, Vologda, Voronezh, Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous Region, Yaroslavl
Group 3:
Amur, Buryatia, Chukotka Autonomous Region, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kostroma, Mari El,
Orenburg, Perm, St. Petersburg, Stavropol, Tula, Vladimir, Volgograd

90

Table 23: Impact of appointment law induced affiliation with the central party at any point in
time on public utilities and transportation

VARIABLES
Party Change * Post
Socio-economic
characteristics
R-squared
Observations

(1)
Log heat
pc

(2)
Log sewage
pc

(3)
Log water
pc

(6)
Log road
volume

(7)
Log bus
volume

-0.003
(0.066)

-0.044
(0.045)

0.030
(0.035)

-0.012
(0.032)

-0.025
(0.086)

YES
0.115
899

YES
0.387
825

YES
0.232
814

YES
0.613
872

YES
0.182
896

Notes: Treatment group is all states that have changed their party affiliation to UR at any point
between 2005 and 2012. Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate regression
model. All regression include year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Background on opposition parties in Russia.
UR is the party of power in Russia. It has been holding the majority of Parliament seats since
2003. However, there exist a number of other parties, which are either minority parties
represented in the Parliament, or are not represented in the Parliament at all. For the purposes of
this analysis, all parties that do not hold the majority of Parliament seats are treated as opposition
parties.
The opposition parties included in the analysis are
The Communist Party of the Russia Federation (KPRF)**
The Liberal Democratic Party of the Russia Federation (LDPR)**
The Union of Right Forces (SPS)*
The Agrarian Party of Russia (APR)*
The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)*
The Motherland-National Patriotic Union (Rodina)*
A Just Russia (SR)**
The Russian Party of Social Democracy (RPSD)*
The Transformation of the Urals, (TU)*
The People’s Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR)*
The Russian People’s Republican Party (RNR)*
The United Democratic Movement “Solidarity” (UDM)
*Parties do not exist as officially registered parties any longer. Nevertheless, they were relatively
important members of political opposition in early and mid-2000’s.
**Opposition parties that have been consistently maintaining their seats in the Parliament.
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Appendix 2
Table 24: Metropolitan Atlanta charter schools with priority zones
Charter School Name

Year Opened Grades Priority zone 1 Priority zone 2 Priority zone 3

Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School – Elementary Campus 2001

K-5

Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School – Middle Campus

2005

6-8

Charles R. Drew Charter School

2000

PK-12

Villages of
East Lake

DeKalb PATH Academy

2002

5-8

Buford
Highway
corridor2

Kingsley Charter Elementary School3

1998
(1970)

PK-5

Kingsley
Attendance
Zone

92

Grant Park and
Ormewood
Park
neighborhoods
NPU-W1

Other NPU-W1
neighborhoods

APS district
outside of
NPU-W
East Lake and
Kirkwood
neighborhoods
Clarkston,
Stone
Mountain,
Lithonia zip
codes - 30021,
30032, 30034,
30035, 30083,
30088
DeKalb County
School District
attendance
zones outside
of priority zone
1

Other APS
district
neighborhoods

APS district
attendance zones
outside priority
zones 1 and 2
DeKalb county
school system
outside priority
zones 1 and 2

KIPP South Fulton Academy

2003

5-8

Seaborn Lee,
Heritage,
Feldwood,
Bethune,
Gullatt, Love
Nolan, and St.
Lewis
elementary
school
attendance
zones

Fulton County
Schools
attendance zone

5-8

Conley Hills,
Holmes,
Hapeville, Mt.
Olive, Oak
Knoll, Park
Lane, Harriet
Tubman, and
Brookview
elementary
school
attendance
zones
30310 zip code

KIPP STRIVE Academy

2009

30311 zip code

APS attendance
zone outside
priority zones 1
and 2

KIPP STRIVE Primary

2012

K-34

30310 zip code

30311 zip code

APS attendance
zone outside
priority zones 1
and 2

KIPP VISION Academy

2010

5-8

30315 zip code

30354 zip code

APS attendance
zone outside
priority zones 1
and 2

KIPP VISION Primary

2013

K-25

30315 zip code

30354 zip code

APS attendance
zone outside
priority zones 1
and 2

KIPP West Atlanta Young Scholars (WAYS) Academy

2003

5-8

30314 zip code

30318 zip code

APS attendance
zone outside
priority zones 1
and 2
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North Springs Charter High School6

2007
(1963)

9-12

The Museum School of Avondale Estates

2010

K-8

FCS designated
North Springs
attendance
zone
Avondale,
Knollwood and
Midway
Elementary
School
attendance
zones

FCS district

outside the
Fulton County
School district

DeKalb County
School District
attendance
zones outside
of priority zone
1

Notes: Data compiled directly from charters on file with the Georgia Department of Education, with supplemental information
provided by Georgia Department of Education annual reports, school websites and contacts (Patrick 2015).
1. Neighborhood Planning Unit W (NPU-W) includes the neighborhoods of Benteen, Boulevard Heights,
Custer/McDonough/Guice, East Atlanta, Grant Park, Ormewood Park, North Ormewood Park, and Woodland Hills.
2. The Buford Highway Corridor is defined by I-85 as the southeast boundary, the Fulton-DeKalb county line as the west
boundary, the Gwinnett-DeKalb county line as the north boundary, and a line one-half mile to the northwest and parallel to
Peachtree Street/Peachtree Industrial Boulevard as the northwest boundary.
3. Kingsley Elementary Charter School is a conversion charter. The conversion occurred in August 1998.
4. KIPP STRIVE Primary opened in July 2012 with 100 kindergarten students, and will grow a grade per year until serving
grades K-4. The school serves grades K-3 for 2015-2016 school year.
5. KIPP Vision Primary opened in July 2013 with a 100 kindergarten students, and will add one grade annually to reach full
elementary school capacity in July of 2017. KIPP Vision Primary will serve students in grades K-2 during the 2015-16 school
year. Additional grades will be added each year until the school serves grades K-4.
6. North Springs Charter High School is a conversion charter school, with conversion occurring in 2007. Fulton County became a
Charter System in 2012. North Springs Charter High School began transitioning into the Fulton County Charter System in the
2014-2015 school year as part of Cohort 3. The charter sunsets June 2015, at which time governance transitions to the School
Governance Council and the Fulton County Charter System. North Springs will continue to operate its two magnet programs,
accepting students from outside the designated attendance zone based upon admissions criteria.
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Appendix 3
Table 25: The effect of the NFA on the firearm death rate (fixed effects)

Law
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-9.755
(6.361)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.777

-8.377
(4.771)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.789

-12.69*
(5.728)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.797

-13.25
(8.914)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.813

-0.749
(0.659)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.779

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 26: The effect of the NFA on the non-firearm death rate (DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 1994-1996
Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)
-1.688**
(0.675)

(2)
-1.544**
(0.622)

(3)
-1.214**
(0.465)

(4)
-1.208
(0.741)

(5)
-0.412
(0.573)

-6.117**
(2.445)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.869

-5.595**
(2.256)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.864

-4.400**
(1.687)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.872

-4.377
(2.684)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.877

-1.384
(1.924)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.855

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 27: The effect of the NFA on non-firearm suicide rate (DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)
0.934
(0.750)

(2)
0.930
(0.721)

(3)
0.888
(0.664)

(4)
0.602
(0.422)

(5)
0.567
(0.335)

3.385
(2.717)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.602

3.369
(2.614)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.622

3.217
(2.407)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.628

2.181
(1.531)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.682

1.905
(1.125)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.636

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 28: The effect of the NFA on non-firearm homicide rate (DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)
-0.385
(0.258)

(2)
-0.360
(0.237)

(3)
-0.366
(0.246)

(4)
-0.372
(0.334)

(5)
-0.235
(0.210)

-1.394
(0.935)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.828

-1.304
(0.858)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.838

-1.327
(0.892)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.842

-1.350
(1.212)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.847

-0.790
(0.705)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.825

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 29: The effect of the NFA on non-firearm accidental and undetermined death rate (DID)

Post*1994-1996 Total Firearm Death Rate
Implied Effect of NFA at Mean 19941996 Total Firearm Death Rate
NFA
State Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Economic and regional controls
Percent male population
Percent young and old population
More ages
Flexible Time Trend
Sample Size
R-squared

(1)
-2.237*
(1.108)

(2)
-2.114*
(1.046)

(3)
-1.736**
(0.722)

(4)
-1.437
(0.935)

(5)
-0.744
(0.706)

-8.108*
(4.015)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
261
0.867

-7.660*
(3.790)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
243
0.860

-6.290**
(2.617)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
243
0.871

-5.208
(3.389)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
243
0.875

-2.499
(2.372)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
243
0.854

Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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